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This thesis argues that the building of democratic institutions in new democracies 
was and still is a painstaking task. It shows that the new institutions are fragile and at 
times unable to cope with powerful organized criminal syndicates, rampant corruption, 
illegalism, elite bureaucratic cartels, and weak judicial systems still in the process of post 
communist reconstruction, extreme concentration and personalization of power. 
This thesis proceeds from the premise that organized crime constitutes a threat to 
democracy, in particular a serious threat to new democracies and subsequently to the 
national security of the country. The first section defines organized crime as phenomena 
corroding the democratic institutions.  It deals in particular with the fragility of the new 
democratic institutions focusing mainly on the organized crime activities that threaten the 
national security and the challenge posed to democratic development of Albania. It 
tackles problems of corruption in government and law enforcing agencies. Secondly, it 
considers issues of merging of crime and legal business and their impact on the 
institutions and society at large. Thirdly and most importantly it focuses on the fact that 
organized crime merges with the State machinery, thus undermining the very existence of 
democratic institutions. Fourthly, it looks into some forms of criminal activities such as 
drug business, weapons trade, money laundering, and white-slave trade. Finally it 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 
In today’s world, all countries treat organized crime as a national security threat 
and in new democratic countries as a serious challenge and threat to democracy. When 
we speak today of "national security," we mean more than just "military security." A 
nation must be secure both within its borders and outside its borders. Security, when 
viewed from this perspective, takes on a new dimension.  
With the termination of monopolistic and centralized one-party rule, many 
Eastern European countries experienced a counter phenomenon of political 
fragmentation, institutional weakness, legal confusion and official corruption. Albania 
represents one of the most poignant examples of such developments. 
Albania remained for the most part of the 1990s a weak state where central and 
local government restored public order with difficulty. Equally, if not more worrisome 
has been an evident symbiosis between politics and crime, whereby politicians and 
security forces get into corrupt practices and criminals control substantial sectors of the 
economy. 
During the 1990s Albania became a transit point for cross-Balkan smuggling and 
a trafficking route. It also developed a vibrant home industry of crime in which the state 
loses enormous amounts of money each year in customs and tax evasion,1 while members 
of the administration as well as police chiefs profit from corruption and criminal 
involvement.2
Criminal gangs in Albania have no political affiliation or ideological loyalty. 
They are opportunistic and gravitate toward those in power so they can bribe or bypass 
officialdom. Criminality has become both a symptom and a cause of Albania’s political 
paralysis. 
 
1  IMF has noted that the system is still characterized by  “pervasive smuggling, underreporting on 
invoices, falsification on balance sheets and a general weakness in (tax) law enforcement”. 
International Monetary Fund, Albania, Selected Issues and Statistical Appendixes, Country Report, 
No. 03/64 (Washington DC, March 2003) 25-26. 
2  In its First Evaluation Mission Report on Home and Justice Affairs, released October 22, 2002, an EU 
Commission team states that “ the experts were told for example, the post of the airport chief of police 
costs $ 250.000 a year. For the General Director of Police, 1 million dollars is paid.”, 48. 
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In every country citizens harbor unique feelings and beliefs about their political 
leaders and institutions. Whatever the attitudes and beliefs, they form the political culture 
of the nation and both reflect and shape its politics. But to understand Albania and its 
current political landscape, one should bear in mind its 50 years isolation from the world. 
This long period of absolute darkness resulted in adverse political socialization that needs 
some explanation.  
With the change of the system, the patterns of political socialization were also 
changed bringing thus total confusion. Discontinuity of the political system brought a 
radical change in the political outlook of Albanians. A new political culture is being 
molded, the old values are constantly being transformed and new ones are being 
introduced. During this process, the social fabric was torn apart and, if it is true that each 
new generation builds on what it receives from the past, then one can imagine the 
consequences Albania is facing nowadays. A social disorganization of the entire society 
ensued. Organized social life, as it used to be under communism, was now outdated; yet 
the new societal behavior was not yet in place. Moreover few, if none, knew what that 
form would be.  
Because for 50 years the communist government was responsible for every sector 
of the society, alternative mechanisms to serve as safety nets were not in place.  The 
opening of markets brought in foreign competition. Many factories closed because they 
could not compete in cost and quality with foreign goods. Technology was old and 
outdated. It could not be replaced in time and obviously could not be subsidized any 
more. Unemployment soared as never before. Many Albanians crossed the borders to the 
neighboring countries in search of work.  Many families were divided across borders.  
Phenomena like divorce, abortion, family violence and crime skyrocketed.  “Social 
disorganization prevails when a society in the face of disturbances loses the ability to re-
establish concerted behavior. Such a society may be said to have lost orientation. This 
implies an absence of common objectives between individuals and groups of individuals, 
represented especially in conflicting values, which are referred to as the `heart of social 
disorganization. `” 3
 
3  Herbert Blumer Social Disorganization and Individual Disorganization, in Mass Society in Crisis, 
Social Problems and Social Pathology, (Macmillan N.Y.1968), 60. 
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The chaotic way, which characterized Albania’s entry into modern life, was 
accompanied by the erroneous philosophy of “the-end-justifies-the-means”. It was easily 
absorbed by a society long plunged in chaos and poverty and, the subsequent appeal it 
had on a disorganized society where every one was ‘running’ to grab what was perceived 
to be his part of “contribution” to the society, unjustly taken from him by the communist 
regime, had a perverse effect on the positive cultural values that existed and which were 
inherited from the traditional past.4
Weak institutions, no proper knowledge or education on capitalism, and an 
ineffective state added to the total chaos. Passing from a tough dictatorial regime to a new 
political setting where freedom and liberty was preached (yet not understood), where 
people would consider democracy as ‘absolute freedom’ and thus defy law and 
institutions provided a fertile ground for crime to lay roots.  “A society which tolerates an 
ineffective set of institutions for securing justice and preserving order is divided and at 
war with itself. The individual citizen under such circumstances theoretically has the full 
complement of liberties… but in actuality they are more or less without effect. He is at 
the mercy of quasi official forces operating outside the law.”5
The dire economic situation, ineffective state, lack of democratic institutions, loss 
of life security coupled with conceptual aberrations on democracy led to a self-reliant6 
mentality, quite unique for Albania. The power and moral vacuum, the inability of 
collective conscience to regulate the society, the ‘mental mutilation’ produced what is 
called a shadow- state, a state operating outside the law. Thus, Emile Durkeim notes that  
 
4  The term traditional past is used as opposed to the communist past. In Deprivation as a Cause of 
Delinquency: Economic or Moral, Bernard Lander and Nathan Lander state that “Poverty is less highly 
correlated with crime in Southeastern Europe than in the United States. In the Southeastern Europe the 
culture does not emphasize success goals based upon pecuniary affluence as a desirable and achievable 
by all strata.” Bernard Lander and Nathan Lander,  Deprivation as a Cause of Delinquency:Economic 
or Moral? In Mass Society in Crisis, Social Problems and Social Pathology (Macmillan N.Y. 1968) 
131. 
5  Bernard R., Israel G. and William H., eds. in. Mass Society in Crisis, Social Problems and Social 
Pathology, (Macmillan N.Y. 1968) 163. 
6  Self-reliance was the absolute credo of communist regime. Trying to justify its self inflicted 
isolationism and uniqueness of the so-called Albanian version of communism; Albanians were imbued 
with the idea of self-reliance in order to preserve the communist principles. The idea of self-reliance 
apparently was inculcated in the masses’ sub conscience. 
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“human passions stop only before a moral power they respect. If all authority of this kind 
is wanting, the law of the strongest prevails”.7 This is what happened in Albania.  
Political choices after the fall of communism were also seriously flawed. One 
source of the problem was the immediate replacement of the entire administration, 
following the change of system, with supporters of the ruling party, mostly untrained and 
unprofessional. More serious was the effect it had on the police force and in particular the 
judiciary. Regarding the latter, politically affiliated, untrained people replaced the entire 
body of lawyers and judges. The police force too, became a victim of politicization. 
Becoming a policeman necessitated only that you prove you were a member of the ruling 
party.8
Due to such a situation, Albanians returned to old patterns of settling accounts by 
themselves. The so-called Kanun of Leke Dukagjini re-emerged from history. In his book 
Kosovo, A Short History, Malcolm writes that Kanun is associated “ above all with the 
archaic and terrible laws of the blood feud; and some news reports on the revival of the 
blood-feud in post communist Albania have given the impression that the Kanun, which 
is now being implemented in the Malësi is nothing more than a system of vendettas.”9
Albania has proved to be a bountiful land of opportunity for assorted criminal 
elements, organized gangsters, and corrupt officials. The varieties of criminal activity can 
be divided into three broad categories: domestic gangs, international crime syndicates, 
and politically connected networks that prey on the disintegration of the state economy. 
All three forms of criminality have prospered not only because the forces of law and 
order were left unprepared, but also because well-connected politicians and security 
officials themselves benefit from "robber capitalism" and illicitly acquired funds.  
In the domestic context, local gangs who can bribe poorly paid or corrupt police 
officials thrive on the new availability of weapons and the fear or gullibility of large 
 
7  Emilie Durkheim,  quoted in Lander and Lander “Deprivation as a Cause of Delinquency:Economic or 
Moral?” in Mass Society in Crisis, Social problems and Social Pathology, Bernard R.,Israel G. and 
William H. eds.,  McMillan, New York,1964. 
8  In the period between 1992-1994, the then government organized six month training courses mostly 
for people affiliated to the ruling party to become judges and lawyers. However incredible it might 
look, the fact is that these people were running the judicial system in Albania. Most of them are still in 
the judiciary. 
9   Noel Malcolm, Kosovo A Short History, (HarperCollins, New York 1999), 18. 
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sectors of the population. Robbery, murder, drug smuggling, prostitution, and money 
laundering have been on the rise in recent years, and the police are overwhelmed by the 
scale of the problem. Mobsters have filled the legal limbo between communism and an 
embryonic market economy. Domestic gangs either cooperate or compete with well-
organized international syndicates. These new "multinationals" focus 
primarily on smuggling, including weapons, drugs, stolen goods, and people. Racketeers 
also smuggle refugees from the country, the region and the Third World into the EU for 
a substantial fee. Drug traffickers also revived the traditional Balkan route between Asia 
and Western Europe after UN sanctions against Yugoslavia were lifted. Thus The 
Guardian of May 26, 1999 notes: “Arms smuggling from Albania into Kosovo and 
Macedonia started at the beginning of 1992, when the Democratic Party came to power 
[in Albania], headed by President Sali Berisha. An expansive underground economy and 
cross-border trade in oil, arms and narcotics had developed largely as a result of the 
embargo imposed by the international community on Serbia and Montenegro and the 
blockade enforced by Greece against Macedonia.” 10 Heroin, hashish, and cocaine from 
Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Middle East are again flooding the European 
market. Many local couriers as well as officials benefit from this lucrative trade. 
Meanwhile, customs officials lack the necessary equipment to detect the drugs. 
 As economies deteriorate, organized crime invariably escalates. Violent 
attacks have soared as a method for settling scores between Mafia-like business groups.11 
Such phenomena can destabilize the transition process. Albania is the most dramatic 
example  of  how  illicit  businesses  in  conditions of economic crisis can trigger political 
 
10  Also, in CIA country report 2002 it has been stated that : “ Increasingly active transshipment point for 
Southwest Asian opiates,  hashish, and cannabis transiting the Balkan route and - to a far lesser extent - 
cocaine from South America destined for Western Europe; limited opium and growing cannabis 
production; ethnic Albanian narcotrafficking organizations active and rapidly expanding in Europe; 
vulnerable to money laundering associated with regional trafficking in narcotics, arms, contraband, and 
illegal aliens.” CIA - The World Fact book 2002, Albania. Located at www.cia.org  
 
11  In a report to the OSCE Permanent Council, Ambassador Osmo Lipponen, head of Mission in Albania 
states that “Recent attacks on some prominent businessmen have generated tensions within the 
business community, who feel threatened”. Report to the Permanent Council, 5 June 2003, 8. Located 
at www.osce.org.al. (20 August 2003). 
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instability. The collapsing pyramid schemes in 1997 not only left masses of Albanians 
destitute but also undermined the country's security and political stability as public revolt 
spread through the country. 
The stability of the country therefore depends as much on effectively combating 
organized criminality as on emphatically pursuing market reforms. Without an effective 
anti-syndicate campaign alongside economic progress and honest market competition, 
an increasingly pauperized and desperate public may be prone to inciting the social unrest 
that fuels political instability. Crime fighting and corruption-busting must become central 
elements of market reform.  Furthermore, the governing parties have unfairly dispensed 
privileges to a politically loyal elite, and the legal system is yet unreformed or tied to 
party state interests. This makes corruption and mismanagement 
endemic. Serious economic decline in conditions of political favoritism, organized 
corruption, and social revolt can propel the country toward either internal chaos or 
authoritarian rule. In his report to the Permanent Council of OSCE, Osmo Lipponen, 
Head of Mission, stated that ”efforts to change the everyday economic and social realities 
are not yet producing enough progress (and) there lies the danger for feeding new social 
and political unrest.”12
 If organized crime spreads, prospers, and gains stronger political influence, 
Albania’s progress will suffer significantly. This will undoubtedly affect its security. 
Instead of assisting the country in entering the NATO alliance and EU, European leaders 
might try to shield their countries from the security risks emanating from it. This would 
in effect isolate Albania from the rest of Europe on a long-term basis.  
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on the above, this thesis will argue that the building of new democratic 
institutions was and still is a painstaking task. It will show that the new institutions are 
fragile and at times unable to cope with powerful organized criminal syndicates, rampant 
corruption, illegalism, elite bureaucratic cartels, and weak judicial systems still in the 
process of post communist reconstruction, extreme concentration and personalization of 
power. 
 
12   Ibid. 
7 
The thesis will strive to answer such questions as: Why did organize crime rise in 
Albania? Which activities of organized crime threaten national security? What is the 
impact of organized crime on national security? What effects has it had on achieving 
stable democracy? This thesis will also explore what efforts have been made to combat 
it? How well have they worked? It also considers problems for the future cope with the 
phenomenon. What else should be done? Is the fight against organized crime winnable? 
What is the role of international co-operation in the fight against organized crime? 
 
C. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis precedes from the premise that organized crime constitutes a threat to 
democracy, in particular a serious threat to new democracies and subsequently to the 
national security of the country. The first section defines organized crime as phenomena 
corroding the democratic institutions.  It will deal in particular with the fragility of the 
new democratic institutions focusing mainly on the organized crime activities that 
threaten the national security and the challenge posed to democratic development of 
Albania. It will tackle problems of corruption in government and law enforcing agencies. 
The populace perceives corruption and crime to be an inevitable result of liberalization. 
Therefore citizen support of democracy and market reforms weakens. Elected officials, 
once they are perceived as corrupted by the organized crime, are unable to retain the trust 
and confidence of the populace.  Secondly, it will consider issues of merging of crime 
and legal business and their impact on the institutions and society at large. Thirdly and 
most importantly it will focus on the fact that organized crime merges with the State 
machinery, thus undermining the very existence of democratic institutions. Many 
criminals are trying by all means to get into the organs of power: to become a Member of 
Parliament, a mayor, and a high-ranking official. Fourthly, it will analyze some forms of 
criminal activities: drug business, weapons trade, theft of cars, white-slave trade abroad, 
human organs and radioactive materials trade, contract murders. We will prove that all 
these elements, separately or jointly, do have an impact on the security of the nation. 
Profits generated by drug trafficking are so immense that the economic stability of 
virtually any country could be held hostage by criminal groups, should it be in the interest 
of a group to wield such leverage. The magnitude of the profits serves as a powerful 
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weapon for criminal groups seeking to influence vulnerable governments. Criminal 
groups have become heavily involved in illegal, international arms trafficking. Groups 
have capitalized on the availability of surplus weapons and decreased border controls, as 
well as the presence of strong market demand. Criminal groups have demonstrated their 
proficiency in acquiring a wide range of weapons in a variety of social and political 
theaters. 
 To substantiate our findings we will bring two real life cases, exemplifying the 
impact the organized crime has on the economic and political life of a country. Thus 
chapter three of the thesis will investigate the case of the pyramid schemes and their 
devastating consequences as well as the general parliamentary elections of 1996. Through 
these two extreme scenarios we will try to clearly demonstrate the impact organized 
crime can have on a new democracy and a society and consequently to the national 
security of the country itself but also to the security of neighboring countries. 
 By the end of 1996, tens of thousands of Albanians put their savings and earnings 
into at least ten major fraudulent pyramid schemes that were not predicated on the 
infusion of capital into a new company or real estate but, rather, on the magical allure of 
making money from nothing. The promoters offered no explanations of how profits 
would be made. The Albanian Government was implicated in this disaster. The ruling 
party received endorsements- and substantial financial support- from some of the biggest 
pyramid schemes. Moreover, the leadership studiously ignored warnings from the 
International Monetary Fund in late 1995 and throughout 1996.  Also “ the government’s 
lax control of a thriving arms and drug traffic across Albania’s frontiers may have 
encouraged development of the pyramid schemes, which apparently got some of their 
startup money from these illegal enterprises.”13
 We bring these two cases to exemplify the impact organized criminal activities 
have on new democratic institutions in general, and in particular the security ones. 
During the pyramid schemes crisis security institutions such as intelligence services, the 
army and the police became mere tools of a corrupt, criminal political clique. This led to 
the almost destruction of such institutions. During 1995-1996, the phenomenon of 
 
13  Minton Goldman, Albania in Global Studies: Russia, The Eurasian, and Central/Eastern Europe          
( Dushkin/McGraw-Hill, Connecticut,1999) 125. 
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pyramid schemes was widespread in Albania. The majority of Albanians did not work at 
all and secured their existence with the money invested in these schemes. Their collapse 
therefore caused a strong reaction among the Albanians, which culminated in an uprising 
against government policy. In 1997 the state institutions ceased to exist and the state 
itself collapsed within a few hours. Buildings in which courts, the prosecutor's office and 
local power were located were destroyed, followed by the storming of prisons and the 
release of all prisoners. The police were faced with enormous problems during this period 
of chaos and suffered huge material and human loss. Official data point to 61 police 
officers being killed and 154 seriously injured. According to unofficial data, in 1997 
firearms killed more than 2,000 persons, over 200 drowned while crossing the sea in an 
attempt to migrate to other countries, some 100 people were victims of traffic accidents, 
and many girls were kidnapped and hired as prostitutes in neighboring countries. 
Though the spark that set off the country’s crisis was the collapse of the pyramid 
schemes, the underlying reason was Government’s disregard for the rule of law and a 
persistent pattern of human rights violations. “The Berisha administration tolerated the 
pyramid investment scams and even encouraged people to invest, despite warning from 
the international financial institutions. Evidence is beginning to emerge that some of the 
schemes had direct government ties and were dealing in the illegal trade of oil, arms and 
drugs.”14
 During the unrest between January and March 1997, incredible amounts of 
military equipment disappeared (and partly reappeared during the Kosovo conflict): 
38,000 handguns, 226,000 Kalashnikovs, 25,000 machine-guns, 2,400 anti-tank rocket 
launchers, 3,500,000 hand grenades, 3,600 tons of explosives. Even though organized 
crime groups were probably unable to "control" the situation, it seems clear that they did 
profit from the chaos by acquiring a great number of weapons. Albanian organized crime 
also profited from the financial pyramids, which they seem to have used to launder 
money on a large scale. Before the crash, an estimated 500 to 800 million USD seem to 
 
14  Fred Abrahams, Albania, A Briefing Published by Interhemispheric Resource Center and Institute for 
Policy Studies,  Human Rights Watch, The Present Situation in Albania, May 23, 1997, briefing of the 
US Congress, Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Washington, DC, 35. Located at 
www.csce.gov/helsinki.cfm. (14 September 2003). 
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have been transferred to accounts of Italian criminal organizations and Albanian partners. 
This money was then reinvested in Western countries. 
 The institution of the vote was also marred by fraud and was seriously 
compromised. The 1996 general elections present a clear case proving the above. Both 
cases are closely interrelated but for the sake of explanation and methodology they will 
be tackled separately. Albania’s democratic shortcomings culminated in the severely 
flawed parliamentary elections of May 1996. During the vote count on election day 
ballots were flagrantly invalidated by polling committees to the detriment of opposition 
candidates and parties.  Rival gangs representing the opposing parties increased their 
fighting during the election campaign, allegedly because whichever appeared to have the 
upper hand could count on obtaining the votes of the local population. Even when gang 
activity was related to drug smuggling or other criminal activity, voters felt threatened 
and unable to view the elections beyond their immediate desire to obtain greater security. 
The result, 122 of 140 seats going to the Democratic Party, was a clear signal that 
pluralism in the country was endangered. International observers called for partial or 
complete return of the elections. 
 The review of the most dangerous forms of modern crime naturally brings in a 
question: What to do? How, with what means and methods one should struggle against 
organized crime?  This issue is being dealt with in the last chapter of the thesis. 
 Actually there are at least three schools of thought regarding the responses to the 
organized crime threat, namely the one suggesting that there will be a gradual 
legitimization of criminal capitalists. According to this idea, although the first generation 
of capitalists (in post communist societies) are more concerned with capital accumulation 
rather than with the means of achieving it, they will want their sons and daughters to be 
legitimate, with the result that there will be a gradual transition from illicit to licit 
business. In short there will be a gradual cleansing process.15  
 
15  In the last couple of years in Albania the idea of fiscal amnesty has been advanced several times. 
Following this idea, people will not be punishable by law for the ways they made their money in the 




 The other school of thought suggests that organized crime could become the 
dominant force. Once criminal organizations have consolidated their positions within the 
society then it is very difficult to remove them, especially when symbiotic relationships 
have been established with the political and economic elites. In essence the   idea is that 
instead of the legitimization of criminal capitalism and criminal organizations by the licit 
economy, the process is marked by corruption becoming an all-pervasive phenomenon 
leading ultimately to a collusive relationship between the state and the organized crime. 
 The third school of thought, shared by the author, is that organized crime can be 
fought successfully once its root-causes are identified and clear strategies are put in place. 
 This thesis will follow a two-prong approach. It will seek to thus identify the 
causes and subsequently provide policy recommendations to remedy them. Regarding the 
latter, we will take stock from the experience of countries that have dealt successfully 
with the issue such as Italy, Greece and the United States. Personal experience will also 
provide an important ingredient to this issue. The author will make intensive use of 
government documents (both classified and open source) as well as from various 
publications from specialized international organizations. Academic and think tank 
reports will constitute a substantive source of reference. Last but not least, media sources, 
in particular international, non-partisan media reports on key events in Albania will be 
used. 
 It is deemed necessary by the author to follow this line because of the almost total 
lack of analysis and literature on the subject in Albania as well as meager, almost non-
existent policies fighting organized crime. There is not a strategy per se and the fight 
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II. ALBANIAN ORGANIZED CRIME - MYTH OR REALITY? 
A. ACTIVITIES OF ORGANIZED CRIME THREATENING NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
This chapter will strive to provide a brief account on the existence of organized 
crime in Albania. It will first explain the social context in which it laid roots, legacies of 
the past and how the change of system impacted social behavior of the Albanians. A 
more detailed analysis of the factors explaining the emergence of organized crime and the 
main reasons that facilitated its expansion will follow. In order to be able to understand 
how organized crime functions and to gain knowledge about how organized crime groups 
have become entrenched in society, it is deemed important to provide some insights on 
the very structure of Albanian organized crime. Finally, through presenting some of the 
main activities of Albanian organized crime such as human trafficking, drugs and arms 
dealings and money laundering, the chapter will try to convey the alarming concern that 
organized crime does not only presents a threat to national security in general, but it 
strongly affects the nascent democratic institutions and most importantly the lives of 
Albanian citizens at large. 
 
1.  “We Have No Organized Crime in Albania” 16
Most Albanians celebrated the end of communism and its centrally planned 
economy but they could not envisage that the shift to free enterprise had its unintended 
side effects. For them, organized crime seemed to be an outlandish phenomenon, 
something you only watched in the movies or the television; as a matter of fact a ‘far 
away show’ presented by the entertainment industry. 
 The political change unfortunately created a platform for the growth of the 
Albanian organized crime. The bones of a bankrupt state were there to be picked. A 
rapacious new gangster class rose rapidly. In a very short time span, they have managed 
 
16  In November 2000, the author was appointed Minister of Interior of Albania. In reply to the question 
about the existence of Organized Crime in the country, the chorus answer from senior police leadership 
was: “We don’t have organized crime in Albania”. This led to an analysis of the situation and with the 
assistance of foreign experts, namely International Crime Investigation Training Program (ICITAP), a 
different picture was revealed. 
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to make capitalism synonymous for crime. Together with corrupt officials and politicians 
and a handful of businessmen, these gangsters plunder the country’s coffers. 
The amount of organized crime a nation or community has depends on a large 
number of social, political, and administrative variables. The interplay of these variables 
dictates how organized criminal violations will be identified and enforced. 
Many Albanians did not have much respect for legal institutions under 
communism (except under threat or fear of persecution), so they started with little 
confidence in legal institutions such as the police, government and bureaucracy after the 
end of communism. These institutions represented the tools of repression during the old 
regime. Loss of state structures resulted in the birth of criminal activities, which further 
contributed to the loss of state control. In the initial years of democracy, (to a lesser 
extent nowadays) you would find ordinary Albanians breaking the law with impunity. 
The dire economic situation justified everything. When an opportunity arouse for them to 
benefit from some corrupt form of activity they would take advantage of that not because 
they wanted to do that, but because they felt they should, and it was proper to do it. 
There are two schools of thought regarding the existence of organized crime in 
Albania. The first one maintains that Organized Crime does exist in Albania; however it 
is in its incipient and formative stages.17 According to this school, there are many small 
gangs operating independently (horizontally) which have established ties with organized 
crime elements abroad.  In his book “Albanian Mafia a Threat to Europe”, Xavier Raufer, 
a notable French criminologist states: “There are many visible signs showing that the 
Albanian criminality has reached a high level of organization and sophistication.” 
However, “we cannot yet speak of a   proper Albanian Mafia in the strict sense of the 
term,”18, he adds.  
 
17   This opinion is shared by most law enforcement officials as well as by foreign experts. Thus in a report 
prepared by International Crime Investigation Training Program (ICITAP), a US assistance program, 
in 2000, the above opinion was supported. 
18  Quoted in daily Albanian newspaper Koha Jone, August 25, 2003. 
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The other school of thought maintains that a strong hierarchical 
Albanian organized crime exists.19 This structure appears to be double headed- one, and 
the most senior, has its roots in Kosovo and is active abroad. The other is the new 
indigenous Albania organized crime, which has established ties with these groups and 
other mafia organizations throughout Europe to facilitate their trafficking activities.  
The following assessment of the organized crime situation in Albania is derived 
from briefings, conversations, Albanian and foreign governments documents, media 
(local and international) sources as well personal working experience as Minister of 
Interior of Albania for the period November 2000-February 2002. 
The Albanian organized crime groups are very violent. Their major source of 
income is derived from trafficking in economic migrants, women, children, drugs, 
contraband, weapons and automobiles. Albania is an origin and transit country and the 
criminal elements take advantage of the instability, corruption and lack of organization 
and resources of the Albanian law enforcement entities. Illicit funds are being laundered 
back into Albania from abroad to purchase and develop choice properties suspiciously 
acquired during the privatization program.  
Coupled with the white-collar crime, which is more costly and more dangerous to 
society than street crimes, the scope of organized crime in Albania is incredibly far-
reaching. White-collar frauds, such as election frauds, false advertising, and other allied 
crimes, present a true danger to the Albanian society. Politics, thus, becomes a zero-sum 
game with outcomes ultimately decided by undemocratic means. Control of the state 
translates into predatory exploitation of both the formal and underground economies. 
These large informal power structures continue to operate with impunity from 
prosecution, suborn or blackmail elected politicians, extort profit from entrepreneurs, and 
manipulate the media. Dismantling these power structures and ushering   in   the   rule   
of  law  has  thus  become  a  top  priority  both  locally   and  
 
19  Ralf Mutschke, assistant director of INTERPOL’s Criminal Intelligence Directorate, in his Testimony 
on International Crime, presented to the House Committee on Crime on December 23, 2000, 
recognizes a hierarchical structure for the Albanian Mafia. Located at 
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/3.htm. (17 October 2003). 
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internationally. An understanding that securing the environment requires severing the 
nexus between criminal sources of wealth and political obstructionists remains a top 
priority. 
The nexus between crime and politics is maintained through concealed, informal 
networks that extend into the law enforcement agencies and the judiciary of the state, 
resulting in high degree of impunity. Defeating power structures rooted in the nether 
world of law enforcement operatives, gangsters, and criminals requires committed law 
enforcement structures. A complete spectrum of law enforcement and criminal justice 
capabilities, from intelligence to incarceration, is required. 
To date, however, exhaustive efforts to obtain accurate statistics regarding this 
phenomenon have not been satisfactory. Accurate statistics do not exist and the 
criminal intelligence collecting process is in its incipient phase. There is reluctance on the 
part of Albanian law enforcers to air the dirty laundry to outsiders and superiors. There is 
a feeling of uneasiness with criticism, especially foreign, portraying Albanians as playing 
a major role in drug and prostitution trafficking in Western Europe. Consequently there is 
a tendency to minimize Albania's role in this activity.  
It is similarly true that there is a tendency to overestimate the role of the Albanian 
organized crime activities. In many cases data and analysis are contradictory. Most 
concerning are the prejudiced opinions of Western media on Albanians. Thus savagery is 
seen as one component of a more generally ‘elemental’ quality of human life, and 
certainly the ’savage’ element has tended to be the focus of images of Albania 
transmitted by Western media in their portrayal of post-communist events. Derek Hall, in 
‘Representations of Place: Albania’ notes: “Western media images of hundreds of ‘ant-
like’ people clinging to every conceivable piece of superstructure of a refugee ship 
limping into Italian waters are enduring, and close-up shots of desperate, wild-eyed 
Albanians conveyed across the world’s media a sense of elemental savage.”20  
 
20  Derek Hall, Representation of Place: Albania, The Geographical Journal, London, July 1999.Vol.165 
Part 2, pg 161. 
Also in his book The World’s Most Dangerous Places, Robert Young Pelton titles the chapter on 
Albania “The Return of the Albaniacs”. Robert Young Pelton, The World’s Most Dangerous Places, 
4th edition (HarperCollins N.Y. 2000), 63. 
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Albania's situation relative to the rapid increase in crime is not unlike other 
post communist countries. Corrupt politicians and criminal elements involved in black 
market activities were pre-positioned to illegally capitalize on the movement to 
political and economic freedoms. This is compounded by the turmoil extant in the organs 
of public order at that time. With the collapse of communism, the Albanian Ministry of 
Interior, which was modeled on the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, for obvious 
reasons, was purged of its communist elements. Consequently, a cadre of experienced 
police officers was removed and replaced by inexperienced and sometimes illiterate and 
corrupt officers many of whom were hired because of their political connections. This 
inexperience and generally low level of ability became apparent during 1997 when 
economic collapse was followed by public disorder and looting. For all intents and 
purposes these new officers abandoned their responsibilities and in many cases took 
advantage of the chaotic situation. In the wake of the economic collapse aggravated by 
the inevitable collapse of the pyramid schemes the Socialist Party replaced the 
Democratic Party and reappointed many of the former experienced police officers. The 
immediate task was to reclaim the countryside from disorder and criminal elements. This 
process took approximately two years until all the regions of Albania were secured and 
returned to some semblance of law and order. However, to date, only some forty percent 
of the weapons stolen from the military from depots have been recovered: This recovery 
process continues and small quantities of weapons are being located on a continuing 
basis. The availability of military weapons makes police work in Albania a very 
dangerous job. 
Albania has approximately fourteen thousand sworn officers and during the past 
three years more than one hundred and fifty nine officers have been murdered and more 
than 500 hundred have been wounded21 in confrontations with criminal elements. In 
view of the aforementioned events and the past heritage, almost all police activity is 
strictly reactive. Investigations emanate from a crime scene or a verified complaint. There 
is no concept of a proactive investigation. However there appears to be a great deal of 
criminal information being collected. Every prefecture must forward to Tirana every 
 
21 This information is provided in the official website of the Albanian Ministry of Public Order. Located at 
www.mpo.gov.al  (November 20, 2003).  
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three months a record of all criminal activity occurring in the prefecture. However, there 
is no analysis of this information conducted and consequently neither a strategy nor even 
a short-range plan exists. There is nothing comparable to a National Crime Information 
Center (NCIC) functioning in Albania, to collect and disseminate information about 
crime. Conversely information is not even readily shared among the components within 
the Ministry of Public Order (MoPO). The process to authorize two criminal investigators 
from different regions of Albania to cooperate on a joint investigation, until recently, 
used to defy reason and could not have been better organized to benefit the criminal 
elements.  
Cooperation between Albania and its neighbors appears on the surface to be 
improving but in reality this is all an empty shell, because the liaison is cumbersome 
and neither side wants nor can afford the expenses involved in these joint 
investigations especially regarding cases of repatriation of economic immigrants or 
women from third countries.  
Also, corruption partially caused by low wages is endemic and has caused a 
“wilderness of mirrors" which neutralizes police efforts and causes a “can't do” 
attitude. For all intents and purposes there is no accurate record available regarding the 
extent of organized crime. The reactive psychology of floundering from one criminal 
event to another has precluded any serious thought being focused on this problem.  
 
B.  ALBANIAN ORGANIZED CRIME: FACTORS EXPLAINING THE 
CURRENT STATUS 
Organized crime thrives on a weak government, a lack of anti-drug legislation, 
poorly equipped police force, a cash-based economy, and fragile banking regulations. 
Albania, during the transition years, had all of these. Thus, Albanian crime gangs 
flourished in the political and economic chaos that followed the communist regime 
downfall. They are well armed- having acquired sizable quantities of weapons from 
government stocks during the 1997 upheavals. Criminal syndicates have a significant 
presence in the port cities of Durres, Vlore and Tirana as well as other major cities. 
Relying on longstanding cross-Adriatic and Balkan smuggling routes, Albanian criminal 
groups control the local market in consumer goods, arms and narcotics. In addition to 
acquiring heroin from Turkish criminal organizations, Albanian crime groups have 
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become involved in cocaine trafficking, with some South American cocaine being 
shipped directly into Albania. Albanian crime groups cultivate cannabis sativa 
throughout the country for distribution in both the domestic and broader European 
market, particularly Italy and Greece. 
The emergence of Albanian organized crime and its coming on front stage is 
related to a series of factors. These factors comprise both the Albanian diaspora 
organized crime (Kosovar organized crime, Albanians of Macedonia and Albanian 
émigrés abroad) and the indigenous Albanian organized crime all of them in a way or 
another interconnected. 
In the United States it is related to the 1986 break up of the “Pizza connection” 
which apparently opened the way for Albanians who had already been working with, or 
mainly for the Italian organized crime. The other element is related to the development of 
a high ethnic conscience as a result of Serbian repression during the 80’s and 90’s. 
Albanian drug dealers, established elsewhere in Europe, who began contributing funds to 
the ‘national cause’ in the 80’s, used this situation. German Government documents 
relate such a process. Thus the Periodical Report on Crime and Crime Control in 
Germany, when speaking of fund raising activities by various Kosovar émigré political 
organizations, states: “The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)… established the ‘Fund 
of the Republic of Kosovo’… A large part of raised funds is not transferred via accounts, 
but is collected by reliable persons and taken to Kosovo (via Albania) by couriers.”22   
The process of democratization in Albania, as has been explained, resulted in the 
loss of state control. This, in its turn, resulted in the birth of criminal activities. The 
outbreak of the war in Yugoslavia and the blocking of the traditional Balkan route of 
heroin trafficking is another cause for the Albanian organized crime to have come to 
prominence. Heroin was to a large extent smuggled through Albania, over the Adriatic 
into Italy, and from there on to Northern and Western Europe. Another factor seems to 
have been the embargos imposed on Yugoslavia by the international community and on 
the FYROM by Greece (1993-1994). This resulted in the development of a triangular 
trade in oil, arms and narcotics in the region, with Albania being the only country not hit 
 
22  Periodical Report on Crime and Crime Control in Germany, 1999, pg.131.  
Located at www. Bundeskriminalmt.de/  (November 27, 2003). 
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by embargo. The 1997 collapse of the pyramid schemes in Albania and the resulting 
chaos and looting of the army depots created a fertile ground for organized crime groups 
to profit from weapons trafficking and money laundering in the schemes. The Kosovo 
conflict and the refugee problem in Albania resulted in an enormous influx of refugees as 
well as financial aid which the organized crime, through corrupt officials and dirty deals, 
managed to augment its financial assets. The refugee influx “generated a smuggling 
boom so great that the Albanian clans had to turn desperate customers away...[These 
clans] were smuggling more than 10,000 Kosovar refugees per month during the war.”23 
The last element is the massive migration move of the Albanians abroad during the 90’s 
and the drastic increase of the Albanian diaspora in the USA, Canada, Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, England France and elsewhere.24 As well as providing a perfect cover for 
Albanian criminals, this diaspora is also a useful source of income for racketeers 
 
1.  Structure of Albanian Organized Crime Groups 
Law enforcement officials in the US and throughout Europe are trying to 
determine whether or not the Albanians are indeed organized. Questions remain as to 
their actions and if these are the acts of small semi-independent gangs, or fall under the 
command of one family or a group of families. It, however, appears that the structure of 
these groups, due to their quick rise, success rates, and coordination of activities, 
suggest a hierarchical chain of command. “Yet it seems that in Europe, as well as to 
some extent in the US, the chain of command is a decentralized one that allows for 
flexibility among the small crews which carry out activity, while general directives flow 
from top to the bottom.”25   Thus the structure and culture of Albanian organized crime 
 
23   Frank Cilluffo and George Salmoiraghi in “And the Winner is…the Albanian Mafia”, The Washington 
Quarterly, autumn 1999,22. 
24  For further information on this issue see Ralf Mutschke, assistant director of Interpol’s Criminal 
Intelligence Directorate, in his Testimony on International Crime, presented to the House Committee 
on Crime on December 23, 2000. Located at ttp://www.house.gov/judiciary/3.htm. (17 October 2003).  
 
25  Gus Xhudo “Man of Purpose: The Growth of Albanian Criminal Activity”, (A Frank Cass Journal, 
University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA), Volume 2, spring 1996, Number 1, p.8. 
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seems to be characterized by a mix of traditional loyalties and newfound tradecraft. 
“There is no single ‘Albanian mafia’ per se, only a collection of separate clan 
groups.”26
The definition of organized crime in Albania so far, pertains to small gangs of 
criminals who operate independently (horizontally) and do not interact. These gangs 
are small and the membership is comprised of long time friends or relatives residing in 
the same area. There is, however, a concern and expectation that these groups are 
becoming larger and more structured as their illicit profits increase. These groups, 
especially those involved in trafficking, have foreign contacts operating across the 
borders contiguous to their areas of operation. Although centralized information 
regarding these groups does not exist in a data bank in Tirana, there appears to be 
institutional knowledge among some of the experienced and professional investigators 
who have worked in some of the hot spots such as Shkoder, Durres, Gjirokaster, Vlore, 
Pogradec, Diber and Tirana.  
The limited statistics available indicate there are some 60 criminal groups 
active at this time in Albania. This criminal population totals approximately 400 
individuals. The typical criminal group has 4 or 5 members. However there are 5 or 6 
groups that are larger and have as many as 16 or 17 members or more.27 These groups 
are very violent and fluid. When the leader is killed or arrested the group usually 
disappears and the remaining members join another group. Criminal groups have a 
hierarchy and in most cases the bosses are kept out of the limelight. 
Regarding the Kosovar organized crime groups, they are usually based on their 
socially organized extended families bound together in clan alliances. Loyalty and 
secrecy is continuously being maintained and infiltration is difficult. Also, given the 
decentralized nature of the organizations, closure of one crew activities, does not 
jeopardize the entire regional unit’s operations. Lyman and Potter in Organized Crime 
 
26  Mark Galeotti, “Albanian Gangs Gain Foothold in European Crime Underworld”, Jane’s Intelligence 
Review, November 01, 2001, p3. 
27  International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), Organized Crime 
Investigation. Internal document prepared for the Ministry of Public Order of Albania, 7 July 2000. 
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identify the Albanian crime groups as “tending to be tightly organized groups of 
individuals related to one another as part of an ethnic clan system.”28  
The Italian Anti mafia Investigation Directorate (AID), one of the most 
knowledgeable law enforcement agencies regarding the Albanian organized crime, 
maintains that 
 There are many small groups involved mainly in trafficking in 
human beings through illegal immigration and prostitution or exploitation 
of children for begging. Such small organizations are not connected 
among them, if not occasionally to conclude single businesses; sometimes 
they fight among them to achieve supremacy over the territory…Those 
Albanian crime groups showing a better organization appear more 
dangerous, since they are characterized by a transnational nature of their 
illicit businesses; these are often conducted directly from Albania, where 
the leaders of the whole organization reside. In Italy and in Europe, 
sometimes also overseas, only accomplices settle and very seldom the 
leaders participate personally in the important agreements with the local 
underworld.29  
 
From data possessed and literature on the subject, it appears thus that the 
Albanian organized crime is bifocal, i.e. small groups, which, as a general rule are 
family based, and larger groups operating at a transnational level, that are marked by 
specific mafia-type characteristics. 
  Thus, in a 2000 publication of the AID it is being stated that 
 
The family ties, deemed to be unifying factor of the smallest 
groups, become less important as the organization becomes wider; larger 
groups, are marked by specific mafia-type characters, pyramidal roles, and 
well-subdivided tasks and roles among its members. The control of the 
activities carried out by the various cells operating in various countries of 
the EU, including Italy, on behalf of the leaders residing in their own 
country, is ensured by several representatives who belong to the same 
ethnic group and who are in possession of a regular permit of stay.30
 
28 Michael D. Lyman, Gary W. Potter, Organized Crime, Third Edition, (Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 
2003),  376. 
 
29  Ministero Dell’ Interno, Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, Attivita Svolta e Risultati Conseguiti, 
Semiannual Report, January-June 2000, p 27, located at www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/eng/ (20 
November 2003). 
30  Ministero Dell’ Interno, Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, Attivita Svolta e Risultati Conseguiti, 2nd 
Semiannual 2000, p.39, located at www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/eng/. (20 November 2003). 
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It should, however, be noted that the situation where larger groups became 
extremely dangerous evolved with the passing of time and the increase in scope, 
sophistication and activity of such criminal groups. Italian law enforcing agencies 
reached to a similar conclusion confirming the fact that “from mid 90s, Albanian 
criminals experienced a sort of evolution, in that at the beginning they did not act in an 
organized form but later they established criminal organizations rooted in Albania.”31 
In its report on Activities and Results for the second half of 1999, the AID refers only to 
the danger posed by the small family based organizations.32
Another salient characteristic of the Albanian organized crime groups is the fact 
that the heads of such groups or as they are called ‘the bosses’ prefer to reside in 
Albania, where they benefit from weak institutions, corrupt police and politicians. 
Investigative results from AID have confirmed that 
 
The assumed presence in different regions of criminal cells, often 
consisting of couriers or representatives rather than their heads that, except 
infrequent travels, preferred to be safe in their home country. Even the 
smaller groups, which are mostly family run and involved in prostitution 
exploitation and drug trafficking activities of lesser scope, were in the 
process to change their structure and extend the management of sex 
business abroad, in the Schengen area, traveling to and from Italy.”33  
 
 
Dr. Mark Galeotti has reached to the conclusion that the sophistication and 
evolving of the Albanian organized crime groups has made them a serious criminal 
 
31  Ibid., 41. 
32 The Report states: “In Italy, the trafficking in illegal aliens represented the driving force through which 
the other crimes were carried out; their danger is enhanced by the family based organization (besides 
the usual connections with the motherland) and allows the perpetration of crime even if one of the 
members is arrested or forced to leave Italian territory. …It appears that the ‘enemies’ to fight 
against, are mainly family-based crime groups, which being extremely mobile, must first be 
proactively identified in the territory and later, dismantled through ad hoc police investigation.” 
Ministero Dell’ Interno, Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, Activities and Results, second half of the 
year 1999, pp29-30. www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/eng/ (20 November 2003). 
 
33 Ministero Dell’ Interno, Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, Activities and Achievements, Semiannual 
report, July-December 2001, p.54. Located at www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/eng/ (20 November 2003). 
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threat because now they no longer depend so closely “on ties of blood and on the heroin 
trade but are able and willing to recruit outside its own community and engage in new 
forms of criminal businesses.”34  
The above conclusion is corroborated by a recent report on organized crime in 
Europe published by Europol. The 2003 Report considers Albanian organized crime 
groups to be among the main threats to the EU. It characterizes them as “extremely 
violent” and as “having an increasing amount of contacts with other groups.” The said 
report also notes that Albanian organized crime groups have “taken over certain 
criminal markets” such as in the case of “vice industry in the United Kingdom and in the 
Turkish heroin trade” yet “not entirely abandoning their role as criminal service 
providers, although this has moved into a new direction.”35 In the 2003 Report of AID 
it is being confirmed that now the “stereotype according to which the Albanian crime 
phenomenon is solely connected with the clandestine influx, has been overcome and at 
present in its modus operandi [it] is entirely comparable to organized crime of mafia 
type.”36
2.  Activities of Albanian Organized Crime 
Until the end of 2002 it was believed that indigenous Albanian organized crime 
activity can be generally broken down into the following categories: Trafficking (75%), 
Financial Crime (15%) and Corruption (10%). These are very general figures and most of 
the Ministry of Public Order (MoPO) officials believe these numbers generally reflect 
what is occurring in Albania.  
a.  Human Trafficking 
 The involvement of organized crime groups in Albania in the trafficking 
in human beings, weapons, automobiles and drugs has become an issue of major concern 
due to its rapid expansion and transnational scope. Until recently Albania had remained 
an isolated and conservative country in Southeastern Europe due to five hundred years of 
 
34  Dr.Mark Galeotti “Albanian Gangs Gain Foothold in European Crime Underworld, Jane’s Intelligence 
Review, November 01, 2001, p2. 
35  2003 European Union Organized Crime Report, p14. Located at http://europa.eu.int. (17 January 
2004). 
36   Ministero Dell’ Interno, Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, Activities and Achievements, Semiannual 
report, Vol.1 2003, p.29. Located at www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/  (20 November 2003). 
25 
                                                
Ottoman presence and fifty years of communism. Since 1990 Albania has witnessed a 
decade of radical change and instability. During the transition period, Albania 
was confronted with a vicious cycle of poverty, weak state authority, and crime.  
 Albania is not unlike other countries of post communist Eastern Europe 
wherein organized crime groups became active and in some cases very powerful during 
this period. Albania's location, weak infrastructure, and porous borders allow organized 
crime groups to profit illegally by trafficking weapons, drugs, cigarettes, automobiles and 
illegal aliens. These criminal groups have flourished leading also to the emergence of 
trafficking in young women and children for commercial sexual exploitation. In Albania, 
a detailed picture of the dimensions and mechanisms of the trafficking business does not 
exist. Recent estimates suggest there are several thousand Albanian women working 
abroad as prostitutes and there are no estimates regarding the movement of women from 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. “The number of Albanian prostitutes is 
estimated to be approximately 15,000 in Italy, 5000 in Greece, and about 100 in 
France.”37
 Successes by the Italian law enforcing agencies however revealed seventy 
percent of the women recently intercepted in Italy were Albanians. Albania is also a 
transit country for trafficking young women from Central and Eastern Europe as well 
where Albanian criminal groups have established contact with foreign criminals involved 
in trafficking. The routes used to transport the young women into Albania are mainly 
through Montenegro, Macedonia and Greece. Almost all of them end up in Italy. “Over 
37 per cent of the prostitutes are thought to be minors.”38 Although drugs, weapons and 
automobiles usually enter Albania by land routes the traffickers use the sea routes to 
transport the women, children and economic immigrants to Italy. A report in the Los 
Angeles Times in 2001 confirmed “that clans of violent Albanian traffickers who also 
smuggle cigarettes and drugs have been the sex trade's dominant force since 1997, when 
the  collapse  of  Albania's  pyramid  investment  schemes  and the country's descent into  
 
37  Albanian Human Development Report 2000, p31. Located at www.al.undp.org. (17 December 2003). 
38  Ibid. 
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anarchy triggered a surge of westbound migration. Today an estimated 30,000 Albanian 
women are sex slaves abroad, half of them in Italy, according to the international relief 
agency Save the Children.”39
 Sadly the criminal groups from Albania have created profitable 
partnerships with Albanian criminal organizations in Italy. These groups have ties to the 
Italian Mafia. According to Ralf Mutschke, assistant director of Interpol’s Criminal 
Intelligence Directorate, “Italian organized crime groups, particularly Sacra Corona Unita 
from Italy’s Puglia region across Adriatic Sea, were quick to establish a presence in 
Albania.”40   On the 27th of July 1999 police in Durres, a port city in Albania, with the 
assistance of the Italian police arrested one of the godfathers of the “Sacra Corona 
Unita”, Puglias Italian mafia. This Albanian link confirms that the Sacra Corona Unita 
have “officially” accepted Albanian organized crime as a partner. Some sources even 
state that it is “believed that Albanians had taken over most of the prostitution enterprises 
in Italy by 1999.”41
  Migrant trafficking is not a new problem, but it grew in scale and 
complexity. The Albanian groups are mainly responsible for the crossing of the Adriatic 
Sea from the  
 
39 Richard Boudreaux, the Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles, Calif.: Aug 17, 2001.  pg. A.1 
 
40   Ralf Mutschke, assistant director of INTERPOL’s Criminal Intelligence Directorate, Testimony on 
International Crime, presented to the House Committee on Crime on December 23, 2000. Located at 
ttp://www.house.gov/judiciary/3.htm. (17 October 2003). 
Also, the Italian Antimafia Investigation Directorate in its semiannual report for the second half of 
1999, p.22, notes :”Indeed along the  Italian territory, some representatives of the most significant 
‘ndrine’ proved being connected with foreign criminals, including Albanians, Kosovo nationals, 
Egyptian and Turks. On this purpose it is important to notice the interconnection of illicit relations 
found out between Albanians settled in the province of Reggio Calabria and figures belonging to 
mafia crime groups of the same city.” Located at www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/eng/ (20 November 
2003). 
 
See also Frank Cilluffo and George Salmoiraghi in “And the Winner is… the Albanian Mafia”, The 
Washington Quarterly, autumn 1999. They state:” The smugglers forged alliances with their criminal 
counterparts in Italy, including La Cosa Nostra. It is an open secret that the Italian Mafia relocated to 
Vlore, a coastal town in southern Albania, after the recent Italian crackdown on organized crime.” 





                                                
Albanian coast to Italy. Departures take place mainly from Vlore, some of them from 
Durres or even Shkoder or Ulqin in southern Montenegro. “Since the early nineties, the 
Albanian crime groups were dealing with the aforementioned activities, and indeed 
managed to have the monopoly on the transit of illegal aliens over the Adriatic Sea; they 
represent the last ring of a much broader international organization, going from the Far 
East mafias to Eastern European mafias.”42
 Poverty in the developing and post-communist world is the root cause of 
much of the contemporary migration. However trafficking fees are often too high for the 
very poor and many migrants do not originate from the poorest regions of the developing 
world. Many Chinese migrants passing through Albania originate in affluent provinces of 
China but conversely the women and children from economically depressed areas of Asia 
and Eastern Europe are more than likely being exploited. Consequently the traffickers 
charge healthy tariffs to those who can afford to pay and exploit those who are unable to 
pay by delivering them voluntarily or involuntarily into commercial sexual exploitation 
or indentured servitude.  
 Thus, Lyman and Potter in Organized Crime, identify three primary 
characteristics of countries targeted by traffickers wherein they find their victims: “poor 
economic and employment prospects for women, well-defined and organized extant 
criminal organizations, and a culture that emphasizes a subordinate role for women in 
society.”43
 The traffickers profit also from lax sanctions in many parts of the world 
including Albania. Trafficking has increased because legal immigration possibilities in 
many countries have been substantially reduced. Entry restrictions, especially in Western 
Europe, have been increased. At the same time, the fall of the Berlin Wall created 
pressures for migration from Central and Eastern Europe and enabled migrants from 
 
42  Ibid., 29 
43  Michael D. Lyman, Gary W. Potter, Organized Crime, Third Edition, (Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 
2003), p.211. 
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other parts of the world to transit through these countries on their way to the West. 
Albania, until recently was considered to be a weak link in this process.44  
 For the Albanian crime groups, illegal emigration, even though it cannot 
be compared to the narco-business, is an important source of income bringing in an 
estimated fifty million dollars in 1999. Ralf Mutschke, assistant director of Interpol’s 
Criminal Intelligence Directorate, states “that in 1999, approximately 10,000 people were 
smuggled into EU countries via Albania every month. The Italian border patrol 
intercepted 13,118 illegal immigrants close to the Puglian coast from January until July 
1999. It estimated arrivals only in this coastal region at 56,000 in 1999.”45  
 More recently the situation appears to be improving. Increased pressure by 
the international community, government predisposition to fight this phenomenon and its 
commitment to fulfill EU membership requirements, the rise of consciousness among the 
Albanian population and its subsequent pressure on the Government, and increased 
professionalism of the Albanian police have, recently, yielded some encouraging results.  
 Several successful police operations, such as Furtuna Blu in 2001 or Puna 
in 2002, dealt serious blows to the human trafficking from Albania to Western countries, 
mainly to Italy. Thus, in the second half of 2003, during the EU Italian Presidency, the 
Italian Minister of Interior declared that the trafficking of human beings from Albania has 
come to a halt. However, this apparently seemed to be a premature victory cry. On 
January 9, 2004 a tragedy occurred in the Adriatic Sea. Twenty-one people were drowned 
while attempting to cross illegally to Italy. This is the second most serious tragedy 
following the one in 1997 where over 100 people were drowned in the Ottranto channel. 
This  phenomena  show  that  the  fight  against  trafficking in human beings should be a  
 
44  In 2001 the Italian Minister of Interior declared that the trafficking of human beings from Albania to 
Italia has diminished to 40 per cent. In 2003, the Italian Prime Minister, Berlusconi, declared that the 
human trafficking across the Adriatic has ceased completely. 
45  Ralf Mutschke,, assistant director of INTERPOL’s Criminal Intelligence Directorate,  Testimony on 
International Crime, presented to the House Committee on Crime on December 23, 2000, p.5. Located 
at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/3.htm. (17 October 2003). 
Also in Albanian Human Development Report 2000 it is being stated that during 1997, 7000 families 
in the city of Vlore lived from the profits of the clandestine traffick and their annual profit was 
estimated to be in the region of USD 250-300. Located at www.al.undp.org.  (23 September 2003). 
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continuous one. It should not be expected that the Albanian organized crime groups 
would easily renounce an estimated USD 100 million loss from blocking of the illegal 
trafficking.46
b. Drugs and Arms Trafficking 
 As previously explained, Albania is a poor country and there does not yet 
exist an established market for expensive drugs. According to the Albanian Human 
Development Report 2000, however, “the number of young drug users for every 1000 
youth has doubled every two years.”47 There are approximately five 
thousand individuals in Tirana abusing drugs, according to the same source.  
 The established avenues for trafficking people and contraband are also 
used for drugs. Again Albania is a transit state and a weak link in the international 
movement of drugs. Heroin is moved from Turkey through Bulgaria, Macedonia, and 
Montenegro and into Albania through land routes. It also comes from southern republics 
of the former Soviet Union, Afghanistan, South East Asia and other countries. Most of 
the heroin exits Albania to the West by sea while smaller portions enter Greece 
overland. Cocaine is moved into Albania from United States and South America mainly 
through Rinas International Airport and then moved by sea to Western Europe. There are 
also indications “that a South American cartel has become active in Albania through 
middlemen, in order to place more cocaine on the European market.” 48 This reference 
most likely is linked to the Kuciu-Durda-Berballa case. They were the Albanian heads of 
an international drug smuggling organizations with links in Colombia, Italy, Greece and 
Spain. Their arrest on February 2, 2001 led to the confiscation, in Albania, of USD 1 
 
46  Such a statistics is mentioned in the Albanian weekly magazine Klan of 23/12/03 in its article “Heroin 
Rivers Flow.” 
47  Ibid. 
48  Ralf Mutschke, assistant director of INTERPOL’s Criminal Intelligence Directorate, The Threat Posed 
by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drugs Trafficking and Terrorism, p.5. Located at 
www.russianlaw.org/Mutschke.htm. (20 October 2003). 
Also, in its semiannual report the Italian Directorate of Antimafia Investigation for the first half of 
2001 notes that “recent police investigations shed light on direct relations established with the 
Colombian cartels which are in particular interested in diverting the cocaine flows from the Northern 
Ports, especially Dutch ports, to the more “secure” Albania.” p26. Located at 




                                                
million in cash. The dismantling of this organization also led to 21 international arrests 
and confiscation of 13 tons of cocaine in different countries at different times. The case is 
believed to be a very successful joint operation between the law enforcement agencies of 
the USA, UK, Italy, Greece, Spain and Albania. It is quite significant taking into account 
the fact the Kociu, the head of the organization, was head of the Albanian Judiciary 
Police, practically the right arm of Albania’s General Prosecutor and in public known as 
a “successful” policeman. 
  A smaller portion of cocaine is similarly moved overland 
into Greece. Cannabis is grown in Albania predominately in Fier, Vlora, Berat and 
Shkoder and distributed in a similar manner as cocaine and heroin overland to Greece and 
Macedonia and by sea to Italy.  
 According to the Albanian Ministry of Public Order during 1999, Albania 
identified 355 cases of drug trafficking and 417 individuals have been implicated. In 
2001 according to the same source 325 cases of drug production and trafficking were 
identified involving 353 individuals.49  In the period 1997-2000, law enforcement 
authorities have managed to confiscate 13,811 kg of cocaine, 55,113 kg of heroin, 
13,306,815 kg of cannabis/marijuana, and 15 kg of hashish oil. They also managed to 
confiscate 15 labs of hashish processing.50  
 The massive emigration of Albanians to Western Europe and elsewhere in 
the 90’s,51 apart from providing an enormous source of income for organized crime 
groups in terms of trafficking people to other countries, also provided Albanian organized 
crime groups with an army of individuals who, due to their illegal status in the host 
country and inability to integrate into the community, develop criminal behavior. Thus 
 
49  Analysis of the State Police Activity in the Fight Against Human and Drug Trafficking. Located at 
www.mpo.gov.al/2002/mars/analysis.htm (16 November 2003). 
50  “Short Study on Organized Crime in Albania”, prepared by the Directorate of Criminal Investigation 
Police at the Albanian Ministry of Public Order, February 2001,p3. 
51  According to some data it is being estimated that the number of Albanians in United States is 500,000, 
in Greece 500,000; Germany 400,000; Switzerland 200,000; Turkey 65,000;Sweden 65,000; Great 
Britain 30,000, Belgium 25,000 and France 20,000. Source: Ralf Mutschke, assistant director of 
Interpol’s Criminal Intelligence Directorate in “The Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized 
Crime, Drugs Trafficking and Terrorism.” Located at www.Russianlaw.org/Mutschke.htm. (20 
October 2003). 
  Note: These figures comprise Albanians from Albania proper, the Diaspora and Albanians from 
Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro. 
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Berdal and Serrano note: “Diaspora communities have often provided nodes and 
networks around which transnational criminal activity is organized.”52 They thus 
become affected by or involved in crime, including organized crime. “For those 
emigrants to EU countries or Switzerland, the temptation to engage in criminal activities 
is very high…. [They] are unskilled workers who have difficulties finding a job. For 
Italian organized crime, these Albanians were ideal couriers in the drug trafficking 
business running through Albania…Many of them came into contact with Albanian 
organized crime through Albanian émigré communities located throughout Western 
Europe. This gave an impetus to the dispersion and internationalization of Albanian 
criminal groups.”53
 It is a known fact already that the Albanian trafficking networks are 
becoming more and more powerful, partly replacing Turkish networks. Thus, according 
to Mutschke, “Albanian criminal groups, while relying on Turkish traffickers as a source 
for heroin, they have become major competitors of Turkish criminal groups in trafficking 
drugs.”54
 With the outbreak of the war in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 and the 
blocking of the traditional Balkan route, some 60% of the European heroin found its 
alternative route through Albania, over the Adriatic into Italy and from there on to the 
Northern and Western Europe. According to some estimates “Albanian networks control 
about 70% of the heroin market today in Switzerland, Germany, Austria and the 
Scandinavian countries. According to analyses of the Swedish and Norwegian police 
80% of the heroin smuggled into the countries can be linked to Albanian networks. In 
1998, Swiss police estimated that 90% of the narco-business in the country is dominated 
by Albanians.”55  
 
52  Mats Berdal and Monica Serrano eds. (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2002) Transnational Organized 
Crime and International Security: Business as Usual?, p.5. 
53  Ralf Mutschke,, assistant director of INTERPOL’s Criminal Intelligence Directorate,  Testimony on 
International Crime, presented to the House Committee on Crime on December 23, 2000, p.4. Located 
at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/3.htm. (17 October 2003). 
54  Ibid., p.17. 
55  Ibid., p.5. 
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 Albanian mafia-type crime groups, according to Jane’s Intelligence 
Review, currently control 40% of the heroin trade throughout Europe.56  On the subject 
of drug trafficking, the Italian law enforcement agencies note that “they [Albanian 
criminal groups] took a central role in the management of drug trafficking activities. 
They purchased huge quantities directly from Turkish (heroin) and Colombian (cocaine), 
and then introduced it into the market of our country, acting as brokers also for the major 
Italian criminal groups.”57 Thus, Italian police during 2000, in a series of anti-mafia 
operations codenamed Arco, Danubio Blu 2, Urano, Teuta, Adriatico targeted Albanian 
and other criminal organizations involved in international drug trafficking. 
 In fact “European law enforcement officials believed that by 1999 the 
Albanians had become the dominant suppliers of heroin to Norway, Sweden, Southern 
Germany and Switzerland. In addition, by 1999, Albanian crime syndicates were 
challenging the hegemony of Italian syndicates in heroin trafficking and alien smuggling 
in Italy.”58
 In 1997, the collapse of the pyramid schemes caused nation-wide unrest, 
during which enormous amounts of weapons and ammunition were looted from army 
depots (and partly reappeared during the Kosovo conflict and in some Western European 
countries, in particular, Italy and Greece). Official data report that 550,000 weapons were 
stolen out of which 38,000 hand guns, 226,000 kalashnikovs, 25,000 machine-guns, 2400 
anti tank rocket launchers, 3,500.000 hand grenades, 3,600 tons of explosives. 
 The trafficking of weapons by Albanian organized crime groups has 
become a major security issue for the region. Italian authorities are “sure that the 
Albanian organized crime supplies drugs and arms on a vast scale to the Italian organized 
crime…that are willing to take advantage of the Albanians’ low-cost supply to buy war 
weapons and explosives.”59  
 
56  Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 01,2001, p2 
57  Ministero Dell’ Interno, Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, “Activities and Result”s, second half of the 
year 2001, p54. Located at  www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/eng/. (20 November 2003). 
58  Michael D. Lyman, Gary W. Potter, Organized Crime, Third Edition, (Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 
2003), p.376. 
59  Ministero Dell’ Interno, Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, “Activities and Results”, second half of the 
year 1999, p30. Located at  www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/eng/. (20 November 2003). 
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c. Money Laundering 
 Albanian organized crime profited from the 1997 chaos in Albania 
resulting from the collapse of the pyramid schemes that they had used to launder money 
to a large scale. Before the crash, “500 to 800 million USD seem to have been transferred 
to accounts of Italian criminal organizations and Albanian partners.”60 The pyramid 
schemes case and its impact on Albanian society will be dealt in more detail in the 
following chapter. 
 Albanian organized crime groups operating outside Albania usually 
transfer their capital to the country of origin i.e. Albania, Kosovo or Macedonia, where 
they purchase property, real estate and businesses and do the same activities in the target 
countries. Thus, according to the Italian Anti mafia Investigation Directorate  (AID), the 
Albanian organized crime groups “reinvest directly in their motherland, and in 
purchasing real estate in Italy, to be used as operations’ bases or havens.”61 The same 
source confirms that the operation codenamed Adriatico, carried out by the Italian police 
in 1999, revealed the presence of a “spread-out criminal organization, made up of 
Albanians, involved in narcotics trafficking, mainly cocaine coming from the USA 
through couriers and distributed in Northern and Central Italy…The laundering of the 
illicit proceeds of such trafficking amounted to 12 billion lire.”62
 The laundering of illegal profits is commingled with finance related to 
capital flight and tax evasion schemes. According to Jane’s Intelligence Review “the 
black economy smuggling operations are controlled by well-organized criminal groups 
that oversee major regional smuggling and trafficking operations, and routinely launder 
their proceeds through Albanian financial institutions. Law enforcement agencies in  
 
60  Ralf Mutschke, assistant director of INTERPOL’s Criminal Intelligence Directorate, The Threat Posed 
by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drugs Trafficking and Terrorism. Located at 
www.russianlaw.org/Mutschke.htm. (20 October 2003). 
61  Ministero Dell Interno, Direzione Investigativa Antimafia,, Activities and Results, second half of 
1999,p31. Located at www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/eng. (20 November 2003). 
62  Ibid, p52. 
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neighboring countries, including the Italian Guardia di Finanza and the Turkish national 
police, concluded that Albanian money laundering was a major threat to European 
financial institutions.”63
 In Albania, during the past ten years corrupt political figures and 
organized crime groups laundering illicit funds managed to corrupt the privatization 
process and acquired choice properties. Such elements are now developing these 
properties with laundered funds, especially in Tirana and select seashore areas. The 
danger from organized criminal elements is illustrated by the wave of illicit commercial 
construction that has taken place in Albania. In addition to being an attractive way for 
criminal enterprises to launder money, many of these structures are built illegally on 
municipal property. In the 2003 annual report, the Italian AID substantiates the above 
observation. Thus it “confirms once again that, for the moment, the Albanians prefer to 
reinvest their illicit profits in their motherland, by using couriers and rarely through 
official financial channels. They use these funds in speculative construction and 
commercial activities.”64
  An attack on organized crime must study these allegations and analyze 
available information to establish whether illicit funds from the drug and human 
trafficking are being invested in the Albanian real estate and construction projects.  
 Presently the Albanian MoPO appears to be dealing in allegations and 
suspicions and there is a lack of concrete data and evidence derived from analysis and 
investigation.65  In  spite  of  the  fact that in May 2000 the Albanian Government passed  
 
63   Trifin J. Roule, Stepping up Pressure on the Money Launderers, Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 
01,2001. 
64  Ministero Del Interno, Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, Vol 2,200,p 185. Located at 
www.interno.it/dip_ps/dia/. (20 November 2003).  
65  In the 2001 Report on the Situation of Organized Crime in Albanian of the Directorate of Criminal 
Investigation at the Albanian Ministry of Public Order there are only a couple of examples mentioning 
use of trade companies to carry on money laundering activities. Thus, the said report mentions cases of 
“ASE”,”ALBA Trade” and KNIPS” companies with activities extended in Austria, Bulgaria, Hong 
Kong, Macedonia, Slovenia, Kosovo and Albania and against which penal procedures had started for 
money laundering. Yet the report does not mention if any legal decision has been taken. Source: 
Analytical document on the existence and level of organized crime, definition, factors contributing to 
its emergence and development. What should be done to be more efficient in the fight against this 
phenomenon. Tirana, February 2001, MoPO. (Classified document). 
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comprehensive money laundering legislation, no money laundering cases have been 
prosecuted in the Albanian courts thus far, and no illicit proceeds have been forfeited 
through judicial action.66
 
66  It should, however, be noted that following the January 9, 2004 tragedy when 26 Albanians drowned in 
the Ottranto channel in their effort to cross illegally to Italy, a series of encouraging measures have 
been taken. The Iron Net police operation targeting proceeds of crime (mainly real estate) of criminals 
involved in drug and human trafficking, yielded some promising results. Thus referring to daily 
Albanian newspaper Zeri I Popullit of 17 January 2004, in the time span of one week, the law 
enforcement authorities of Durres district confiscated 38 properties “ such as villas, restaurants, hotels, 
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III. ORGANIZED CRIME AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
A. THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZED CRIME ON NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
1. Corruption of Government and Disenchantment of Populace with the 
Democratic Process 
In framing a government to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in the fact that you must first enable the government to 
control the governed and in the next place, oblige it to control itself. 
 
 James Madison 
Consecutive governments in Albania have not been able to follow this maxim. 
There are many reasons for this, the most crucial being corruption at all levels of the 
political class and the public administration. Corruption is nothing new, nor is it confined 
to any particular corner of the world. It is a problem that has deeply affected the lives and 
stirred the resentment of citizens the world over. Corruption, to put it simply, is the abuse 
of public power for private gains. Although corruption tends to get the most attention, it 
is a symptom of a more general problem of perverse underlying incentives in public 
service.  Moreover, corruption of political-legal organizations is critical to the success of 
a crime cabal. Therefore the study of organized crime should consider corruption, 
bureaucracy and power simultaneously.  
Organized crime is becoming increasingly professional, relying on external 
expertise in an ever-widening international and heterogeneous setting. Organized crime 
groups are known to exploit the absence or delay in political initiatives, or the 
unforeseen, negative consequences of these, as well as judicial change or technological 
advances. Another tactics used by organized crime groups is corruption, which is an 
efficient method of achieving criminal success. A 2003 Europol report on organized 
crime predicts, “this is likely to become more pronounced in the years to come”67
Basically, corruption is of two kinds. In Albania it has most saliently appeared as 
policy oriented corruption and corruption to protect illicit enterprises, which practically 
live in a perfect symbiosis. Unfortunately the Albanian newborn democracy found itself 
 
67   2003 European Union Organized Crime Report, Europol, p.13. Located at http://europa.eu.int.         
(17 January 2004). 
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unprepared to face the new challenges deriving from the classical crime and especially 
organized crime. Organized crime actively attacked the weak barriers to their activities 
and commodities, and political-legal institutions were their main target.  
On the other side, the vacuum of moral values and the changing cultural 
tendencies with the concept “from the poor equity to the easy moneymaking” became 
fashionable and part of the so-called “new society”. The citizen, in cases where fraud and 
collusion are “a way of doing business,” is equally effective in subverting good 
government. 
If anything, corruption is even more dangerous when it is used by criminal 
organizations, thus constituting a national threat. It violates the public trust and corrodes 
social capital. A small side payment for a given service may seem a minor offense, but it 
is not the only cost- corruption can have far-reaching externalities. Unchecked and 
creeping accumulation of seemingly minor infractions slowly erodes political legitimacy 
to the point where even uncorrupt officials and members of the public see little point in 
playing by rules. The major problem is thus that corruption feeds on itself, creating a 
widening spiral of illegal payoffs. 
The case of Albanian pyramid schemes in 1997 is a case in point. Albania faced 
the most acute kind of corruption during the period 1996-1997 with pyramidal schemes, 
which the then government sponsored with the purpose of creating the illusion of 
economic prosperity, and persuading the electorate to back the government. But the 
collapse of these schemes caused serious economical, political and social problems 
followed by violent troubles ending up in the total collapse of the state institutions, 
putting in question the national security and integrity of the country. Capitalism wasn't so 
easy.  The biggest lesson learned from this was that economic change is not sustainable 
unless there is a change in mentality. Both these elements move in a self-sustaining, 
naturally accelerating circle. Most importantly, it is a very extreme example but it shows 
clearly what can be at most the impact of political corruption in a large scale. 
In early 1997 the international criticism coming from Western chancelleries became 
matched with criticism coming from international media as well. Thus Italian media at the 
time quoting police and other expert sources stated that Italian mobsters may have used 
Albania's failed "get-rich-quick" pyramid investment schemes to launder profits from drugs 
39 
                                                
and other rackets. Leading anti-Mafia investigators, researchers and intelligence sources said 
lax controls in Albania and the close ties between racketeers in both countries made the 
shady schemes a perfect home for dirty money. "We have information that Italian crime 
groups were involved in Albania's financial scandal," newspapers quoted chief anti-Mafia 
prosecutor Pier Luigi Vigna as saying. He was echoed by the head of the Italian police 
organized crime squad, Alessandro Pansa, who said investigations were under way in Italy 
into mob links with the schemes. Also intelligence sources in Rome, quoted by Italian 
media, said it was "quite evident" that Italian mobsters would have pumped money into the 
schemes early on to clean their illegal earnings and make a tidy profit into the bargain.68
The toughest stand towards Albania's then Government was reflected in The 
Independent British daily labeling the regime "a gangster one". The newspaper, quoting 
western intelligence sources, gave detailed evidence of collusion of members of Albania's 
ruling Democratic Party, including Government ministers “in an extraordinary range of 
crimes”.   
The above examples rise another concerning issue, namely that of cross-border 
corruption. As evidenced, cross-border corruption helps keep the country poor and 
politically weak.  It can also inhibit international law enforcing initiatives, as was the case 
with the UN imposed sanctions on Serbia during the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Cross 
border abuses, aided by local officials who share in corrupt deals, impeded the growth of 
sound market institutions and of reliable basic economic rights. It resulted in further 
entrenchment of domestic corruption, delayed or distorted economic development and 
diverted talent and investment from productive enterprise and human-capital-creating public 
services into rent-producing activities. Another repercussion is the fake sense of well being 
that leads to disillusionment, lack of trust in institutions, etc. 
Even though Albania went through this very serious crisis, still lessons learned 
did not really serve to the political class to change this corruption-oriented frame of mind. 
Hence, corruption still remains widespread. Despite the renewal of political life that came 
after 1997, fundamental institutions of democracy-judicial system, the legislature, the 
political parties, even the presidency- remain weak and discredited and some of them 
 
68  OMRI (Open Media Research Institute), Pursuing Balkan Peace. Volume 2, No.7, 18 February 
1997. Located at http://www.omri.cz. (9 September 2003). 
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scarcely functioning. This has put democracy under challenge. Although democratic 
norms are widely accepted in the country and some of them well entrenched, they are still 
under severe challenge, which affects quality of life too. In few words the quality of the 
new Albanian democracy is at risk. This is the essential impact the corruption has on our 
society. Even the fight against corruption can become corrupted when it is 
instrumentalized politically, when it is used not to serve the purpose but to serve political 
and economic interests of one group against another. 
The practice of “la mordida” as known in Latin American countries and use of 
Government runners to transact normal business or otherwise in Albanian known as the 
“sekserē” has become so institutionalized that a whole profession has grown to “assist” 
those who wish to transact business with a government department. Also, an irresponsible 
political class, the weak judiciary and corrupted law enforcement agencies have proven 
unable to enforce laws effectively because corrupt interests have set up shop in the 
country, and the ill-paid, demoralized, poorly-organized bureaucracy practically invites 
rent-seeking. Once the life pattern of “dealing under the table” is established, it is only a 
very short distance to the total seduction of the Government. 
This situation in Albania became quite worrisome. It had become so evident 
within the country and internationally a major problem, that the political class under the 
pressure, both internally and externally, could not remain indifferent. Moreover, the 
country has embarked into the EU integration process, which entails the fulfillment of 
certain conditions. As a matter of fact, the Stabilization and Association process of 
Albania into the EU has merely become a whip and carrot and, for that matter, a very 
efficient tool in the hands of the international community to force government officials 
act in compliance with generally recognized norms of conduct. 
Albania is a relatively small and homogeneous society. As such it sometimes is 
being called “a network society” since people “often interacts on the basis of personal 
relations and connections, characterized by loyalty and dependence, rather than purely on 
basis of professionalism and transparency.”69 Personal relationships are considered often  
 
69  Albanian Center for Economic Research (ACER), Common Country Assessment, Albania, prepared for 
the United Nations System in Albania, June 2002,p.77. The Report is available electronically at 
http://www.undp.org.al. (25 August 2003). 
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more important than relations based on formal roles in political, social, and economic 
structures. This suggests that trust in personal relationships is more important than trust in 
formal legal institutions. 
Citizens’ attitudes constitute another worsening ingredient in fighting corruption 
in the Albanian society, in particular their attitudes towards legal institutions. Citizens do 
not think of themselves as taxpayers with the legal right to inquire into the use of their 
taxes. 
 A 1998 World Bank Report on corruption in Albania categorizes it as a country 
with medium “State Capture” (indicating insufficient accountability) and high 
“Administrative Corruption” (indicating low capability).70 Out of Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Yugoslavia, which were 
surveyed in the above report, Albanian respondents had the highest level of pressure on 
citizens from public officials soliciting corrupt compensation, tolerance in principle of 
corruption, involvement in corrupt practices and pessimism over the country’s ability to 
deal with corruption. 
In view of such a critical situation, in October 2001 the socialist party leader 
Fatos Nano initiated the so-called “movement for catharsis”- a movement purportedly 
seeking to cleanse the government administration from corrupt officials and practices. It 
should, however, be noted that the real reason for the initiation of such a move was 
purely internal party turf fight namely between the ruling Socialist party leader and the 
then Socialist elected Prime Minister. During the campaign that followed, until mid April 
of the same year, when a truce was achieved, the Albanian public became witness of 
many accusations by both sides of alleged involvement in corrupt dealings at very high 
levels. The Socialist leader, Nano, accused the Prime Minister of nepotism, involvement 
in multi million USD shady dealings, favoritism, unfair privatization process, autocratic 
leadership and accumulation of large amounts of capital. The then Prime Minister and his 
followers uttered similar accusations. Initially it seemed that the process would be 
irreversible. The General Prosecutor initiated investigations on high officials, involving 
ministers as well, media became very active and a mouthpiece of the public outcry. But 
 
70  World Bank and ACER, Albanian Empirical report, 1998. 
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the inevitable occurred- the Prime Minister and the Government resigned, the Parliament 
and the President sacked the General Prosecutor in a most doubtful way (later the 
Constitutional Court nullified the Parliament’s and President’s decision of removal of the 
General Prosecutor considering it as unconstitutional).71 At the peak of the so-called 
movement for catharsis, Socialist leader Nano stated that even Nano himself couldn’t 
stop this movement. Yet, quite unexpectedly, Nano forgot about catharsis, and became 
“friend” to those with whom he had interchanged accusations. The reason was simple; 
Nano wanted to become President. He needed votes and allies.72  So much for catharsis! 
Under the guise of “reform” many changes have occurred in the administration 
without observing the existing laws, most importantly the Civil Servant Law. This is 
being felt most seriously in the public order sector. In a two months time span, the new 
Prime Minister changed almost all the Police directors73 and a great number of police 
commissars. The result is evident – increased criminality, smuggling and other illegal 
activities. The reasons seem to be obvious-political insecurity and the sense that one’s 
position is temporary breeds the idea of “stealing as much as one can, and as quickly as 
one can take it”. 
This situation has led to a reality where Albanians refuse to trust any political 
institutions in the country. In the eyes of the Albanian people, almost all politicians are 
corrupt and concerned only with their own private interests, power, and enrichment. With 
the first euphoria about democratic elections in early 1990s having already passed, 
Albanians now consider democratic procedures as useful only to corrupt politicians who 
 
71   The case of the removal of the general prosecutor by the Parliament and the President is quite 
interesting. Being a unique example where a large group of legislators decide to remove in “an 
unconstitutional” way the General Prosecutor, as the Constitutional Court was expressed, shows 
that the interests at stake are quite high. It also shows how far corrupt legislators and officials can 
go. 
 
72  Eventually Nano did not manage to become President. He, however, became prime minister for the 
fifth time. Quite ironically, in December 2003, when Nano was forced to make a Government 
reshuffle, he included in his Cabinet two of the former ministers against whom he had unleashed a 
storm of accusations on corruption grounds. 
73   There are 12 prefectures in Albania, consequently 12 police directors, one for each prefecture. Each 
police directorate has under its own authority 3 police commissariats. The appointment and removal of 
such senior police officers is done under the law on the State Police drafted in cooperation with the EU 
MAPE mission. None of the newly appointed directors or commissars did follow the procedures as 
prescribed for in the said law. 
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use them to deceive masses.74 Thus, for instance, a Freedom House article on Albania 
notes: “The Albanian public continues to view corruption as a problem that is endemic at 
all levels of government.”75 (See Table 3-1) 
Customs officers 86.6 
Tax officials 79.0 
Doctors 71.6 
Lawyers 70.6 
Municipal Officials 69.1 
Ministers 67.8 
Officials at ministries 66.2 
Administration officials in the judicial system 63.0 
Members of parliament 61.8 
Police officers 56.4 
Municipal councilors 55.2 
Political party &coalition leaders 54.7 
Investigating officers 52.7 
Local political leaders 49.6 
University professors and officials 46.0 
Business people 42.6 
Bankers 24.4 




Table 3-1.  Perceptions: % of Albanian respondents who said “nearly all” or “most” 
following groups are involved in corruption76
 
                                                 
74  During the last local elections held in October 2003, only 45 per cent of eligible voters did participate 
in the voting process. This is a major shift in the voting pattern of Albanians taking into account the 
fact that in the course of twelve years, the yield has been between 68-75 percent. 
75  Albania, Located at www.freedomhouse.org/research/nintransit, p.51. 11 December 2003. 
76  Albanian Center for Economic Research (ACER), Common Country Assessment, Albania, 2002. 
Prepared for the United Nations System in Albania, June 2002. Located at www.undp.org.al 
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The conflict atmosphere that has reigned in Albania over the last decade is 
another ingredient that has contributed in creating a fertile ground for corruption, which 
on its side, in a perfect symbiosis with the political conflict feeds it thus making the spiral 
of instability endless. 
Low respect for the existing laws has reduced incentives to respect the 
independence of courts, judges and police officers. Indeed bureaucratic and political 
corruption has become integrated with corrupt leverage and incentives that are shared 
within and between the political and bureaucratic structures. In such a setting, those who 
tend to become reformers are intimidated, frozen out of influence, and the existing anti-
corruption rules and agencies become empty shells. 
In Albania there is also a unique phenomenon- namely that of the bodyguards or 
“tough bunnies”. Politicians, legislators, senior officials almost all have bodyguards who 
practically do the personnel policies. They can hire and fire customs officers, police 
commissars, and other officials according to their liking albeit with the blessing of their 
“boss”. 
Also, one of the most worrying manifestations of political corruption is 
exemplified in the election process. In my former occupation in security structures of the 
Government, I encountered a phenomenon from which the Albanian society will suffer 
long, namely the financing and sponsoring of various parliamentary candidates by 
dubious characters involved in not so clean businesses.77 This stands for both camps be it 
the position or the opposition. Very few from the political class are estranged to this 
system. The repercussions of such a vicious circle are far reaching. They are translated in 
favoritism, appointments in key positions in administration, customs, law enforcement, 
etc. Its consequences are reflected also in the suffocation of legal businesses, weakening 
of institutions, and lack of trust in them, withdrawal of foreign investors, and the creation 
of an unfavorable business climate. According to Freedom House “a public opinion poll 
 
77  Some of these names were made public during the most recent skirmish (2003) between the Socialist 
party leader and former Prime Minister. 
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taken in 2001 indicated that the public considers corruption to be a central factor 
affecting the socioeconomic well-being of the country.”78
A very serious set back to the democratic development of Albania and an element 
that feeds corruption and abuse of power is the lack of balance between public and 
private interests. Privatization in Albania had a much greater impact on the country than 
it is being thought. It did not only transfer the bulk of the Albanian economy to private 
hands, it also privatized the social and political life of the nation to the extreme. In the 
last fifty years of communist regime the superiority of public over private interests 
reigned supreme in Albania. During this period the preeminence of national interests 
reached its peak. The anti communist revolution of the early nineties led Albania into a 
transition from a society with a powerful collectivistic ideology to one in which almost 
everyone, from the ordinary citizen to the highest officials, ignores the public interest 
altogether. Albanians are transformed into a people who are almost totally indifferent to 
any social values or public issue and who are reluctant to make even the slightest 
sacrifice for the public good. 
 
2. Corruptions and Penetration of the Security Forces 
“Police corruption is an illegal use of organizational power for personal gain.”79  
It is a use of the institutional power to encourage and create crime rather than to deter it. 
Law enforcement agencies, being at the forefront of the fight against criminality are also 
a most aimed target for the corruption and this is easy to explain. The legal powers of the 
police such as investigation, arrest and border management entitle police with a lot of 
authority but in the mean time expose them to corruption.  
The ability of the organized crime groups to corrupt the police is indicative of 
the strong influence wielded by organized criminal groups over the authorities. Evidence 
suggests organized crime groups are able to bribe local police officials to continue their 
business. Corruption of law enforcers follows two parallel tiers. First, it is related to the 
low payments and socio-economic situation of police forces in Albania making them 
 
78   Albania, Located at www.freedomhouse.org/research/nintransit,p51. (11 December  2003). 
79  Lawrence Sherman, Scandal and Reform- Controlling Police Corruption, (University of California 
Press, 1978) p.30 
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prone to corruption. Second, which is a more recent phenomenon, is related to the fact 
that the increased pattern of corruption amongst law enforcement agencies is related to 
the emergence of the Albanian organized crime, (the realization by law enforcement 
agencies of its existence), the subsequent drug boom and the somewhat parallel 
intensification of drug control efforts on the part of law enforcement agencies (under the 
constant pressure by international institutions, namely EU and the U.S.). Thus, as the 
share of the crime activities such as drug, arms and human trafficking expanded the 
corruption problems took on a different magnitude. The explosion of transnational 
organized crime turned the problem of routinely small-scale bribing and petty police 
crime into one of an entirely different order. Beleaguered by police, national but mainly 
foreign, organized crime groups opt for the escalation of corruption (and violence). 
Rattled by the impact of large scale corruption and direct involvement in lucrative 
illegal markets and aware that organized criminal groups cannot sustain their activities 
without corruption, the Ministry of Public Order of Albania removed over one thousand 
officers on suspicion of corruption and bribery since the beginning of the year 2003 and 
this effort to purge the Ministry of corrupt officers continues. Nevertheless corruption 
within the existing law enforcement units is still widespread.80  The corruption problem 
will not be totally solved until a new generation of police officers are recruited and 
trained to replace the present cadre.  
This, however, has proven to be a very challenging task. Not only has the much 
needed  professionalism   of   police  forces   proved  impossible  in  such  a c ontext,  but  
 
80  According to statistics offered by the office of Internal Control (OIC) at the Ministry of Public Order 
(MoPO) of Albania during the year 2003, two hundred and four sworn and non-sworn police officers 
were referred for prosecution, 18 were convicted, 252 were dismissed, 143 demoted, 133 were 
transferred, and for 463 were taken other administrative measures, totaling a number of 1213 police 
officers. Source:   Communication with the Director of OIC at the MoPO. 
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significant evidence shows how dismissed police have joined the drug trafficking ranks, 
organized themselves in criminal groups, or simply proffered themselves for hire as 
bodyguards and mercenaries.81
The corrupt character of law-enforcement forces is thus of special importance 
because it deprives Albanian citizens of the hope of getting help from the police and 
courts in their fight against criminals and corrupt bureaucrats 
We must admit that the fight against corruption is not an easy task. This is very 
complicated also by the fact that there is discrete crime and both parties are satisfied and 
no one complains. Fight against corruption is a process. This, however, does not mean 
that being a process one should wait endlessly; neither does it mean that such a 
phenomenon is overcome quickly. 
What is clear, however, is the fact that fighting corruption only within the 
boundaries of one nation-state is an enterprise doomed to failure. In any case, the prime 
responsible to fight corruption in a given country is its people and its political class. This 
requires a new generation of politicians, ideally trained in the West, bearer of western 
mentalities of governance.  
So far, leaders of political parties are so absorbed with achieving private goals 
that they more or less completely ignore the interests of the country. In order to preserve 
their domains of political activity, they antagonize each other as much as possible and 
avoid all compromise. There are virtually no values on which the main Albanian political 
parties agree, and no political movement in the country- whether Socialists or Democrats, 
is able to create unity among its members. The ‘leaders’ of numerous factions are wholly 
absorbed in their private goals and therefore do not want to admit to the superiority of 
anyone in their own party. The marked divisiveness of the Albanian political life requires 
one to suppose that if a new party comes to power, many, if not all, of the rules of the 
political game will be changed. This makes politicians (as well as businessmen) 
 
81  The Kociu case, mentioned in the previous chapter is quite significant. Being a senior law enforcer, his 
involvement in international drug trafficking and his plans to support a new political party through 
funds generated from drug trade (an estimated amount of USD 400m yearly), his plans to implant bugs 
in the working environment of senior politicians and government officials, shows how dangerous and 
threatening to the country such individuals can be. Another case is related to a former policeman 
named Aldo Bare. This person is quite notorious for his deeds. What is concerning in his case is that he 
has never been seen in public since he went in hiding. Moreover his economic activities are “legal” 
under the name of his family relatives. To date he remains one of the most wanted Albanian criminals. 
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extremely uneasy, and forces them to exploit their temporary status for immediate 
rewards, a trend that is one of the most serious hindrances to economic progress in 
Albania today. 
Without wanting to enter into a detailed analysis, I would like to underline the 
fact that the Albanian political class of this decade, not only did not bear the burden of 
building the rule of law in this period, but in many instances it hampered it. The political 
class of this decade is an offspring of the former communist era.  This heritage is 
intuitive, built-in.  It is a reflection of the old way of thinking and acting, perversely 
blended with the worst features the capitalist society bears. This is the major handicap of 
this decade of transition.  Albania needs to grow a new political elite, free from past 
prejudices and oriented towards western ways of governing. The increasing involvement 
of a new generation of politicians in the current political scenery of Albania is a good 
first step. 
 
3.  Risk of Being Branded a “Rogue State” 
Organized Crime in its present state appears to have emerged, as we have seen in 
the course of this chapter, due to endogenous and exogenous factors. Within the domestic 
sphere we single out the state. “The nature and relative strength of a state as well as the 
decisions or omissions of the incumbent ruling class can and do play an important role in 
the emergence and rise of organized crime.”82 The endogenous interplay between 
politics and criminality often provides the ground for the emergence of powerful criminal 
organizations. The experiences of countries such as Colombia, Mexico, Italy, Russia and 
Albania suggest that crime out of control can be a major factor in the subversion of state 
authority. In extreme cases organized crime activities “have threatened the sovereignty 
and the independence of the state in a particularly rapid and dramatic fashion [and] 
activities such as drug trafficking, illegal migration, and smuggling, belong to the  
‘security problematic’ of the century’s dawn.”83 Such a phenomenon is also Europe’s 
concern because it believes that “ in extreme cases, organized crime can come to 
 
82  Mats Berdal and Monica Serrano eds. Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: 
Business as Usual?  (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Bolder Colorado, 2002), p.20. 
83  Ibid., pp 29-30. 
49 
                                                
dominate the state.”84 Similarly, the European Security Strategy document of 8 
December 2003 considers “ state failure [as] an alarming phenomenon that undermines 
global governance and also adds to regional instability.”85
States that become captives will naturally trigger international mobilization to 
deal with their “coma condition”. Unless there are serious, all encompassing efforts and 
measures the captured state might be branded as a rogue state, liable to coercive 
sanctions, a move that would link the threat of organized crime (in particular the 
transnational one) to that of terrorism. 
Referring to the situation in Albania, many elements do indicate that the state runs 
the risk of being labeled as such, i.e. as a rogue one. Here we need to make a brief 
explanation in order to have some semantic coherence. The term “rogue state” in our 
context does not imply the literal use that “applies to states that do not regard themselves 
as bound by international norms.”86 It applies to a debilitated state, weak and unable to 
efficiently cope with the challenge of organized crime. Most importantly it is related to 
the fact that the state capture reaches such a point where the relationship between 
organized crime and politics become symbiotic and thus criminal activities spread, 
infiltrate and manipulate the political system, finally resulting into a kleptopatrimonial 
state. 
Thus Janusz Bugajski refers to Albania and some other Balkan countries as ‘weak 
states’ and quite explicitly states that “If organized crime spreads, prospers, and gains 
stronger political influence…the alliance leaders will try to shield their countries from the 
security risks emanating from Southeastern Europe… Through a combination of political 
and economic measures, the alliance may try to construct a cordon sanitaire around the 
region to limit the most destabilizing ripple effects throughout the continent.”87 NATO 
Secretary General, Lord Robertson echoed this idea on July 16, 2003 urging Albania to 
 
84  COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION:European Security Strategy, Brussels, 8 December 2003. 
Located at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st15895.en03.pdf (4 March 2004) 
85 Ibid. 
86  Noam Chomsky , Rogue States: The rule of force in world affairs, (South End Press, Cambridge MA 
2000), p.1. 
87  Janus Bugajski, Southeastern European Reconstruction-Winning or Losing the Balkans? A CSIS 
European Program project, October 2000, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington 
D.C. p.10. 
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tighten its borders and fight corruption and organized crime. “The international 
community and NATO want better border controls from Albania and a more determined 
fight against corruption, illegal trafficking and organized crime.” He went further by 
warning  against  NATO  aspirants expecting a free ride into the organization, saying that  
they had to put their own house in order first. “Countries looking for membership in the 
northern alliance should contribute to its security and stability and not be only consumers 
of the security offered by NATO.”88  
In a similar, more straightforward language Chris Patten, Commissioner for 
Foreign Policy of the European Commission, has stated that  
 
If you would like to confirm how serious the situation of organized crime 
in Albania is, ask FBI, or any other law enforcing organization around the 
world. [Therefore] it is essential that Albania get prepared to implement 
the obligations stemming from the Association and Stabilization 
Agreement with the EU, because failure to do so might harm the 
credibility of Albania and the perspective of future relations with the 
EU.89
 
 Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, has stated that regarding 
the EU integration; the Commission is facing a big problem with Albanians in particular 
regarding criminality. Such an attitude will not find place in the expanded Europe. 
Whereas in the London meeting of EU and Balkan interior ministers in 2003, the British 
foreign secretary, Jack Straw considered the organized crime in the Balkan countries as ‘a 
serious impediment to their integration into the EU.’  The British Home Affairs secretary 
David Blanket on his side stated at the same event that EU countries are cooperating with 
the Balkan countries such as Albania, Bosnia, Croatia and former Yugoslavia in the fight 
against trafficking of all kind. Asking for concrete actions, Blanket stated that in the 
coming 10 years the Balkan states would be judged by deeds not words.90 In the EU 
Security Document, quoted above, it is being estimated that “ 90 per cent of heroin in 
Europe comes from poppies in Afghanistan, where the drug trade pays for private 
 
88  NATO Chief Talks About Crime, 17 July 2003. Located at www.nato.int (24 December 2003). 
89  Alfred Peza, Heroin Rivers Flow. Albanian KLAN weekly magazine. December 23,2003. Located at 
www.revistaklan.com/lexotext.asp. (23 December 2003). 
90  Ibid. 
51 
                                                
armies.Most of it is distributed through the Balkan criminal networks which are also 
responsible for some 200.000 of the 700.000 women victims of the sex trade world 
wide.”91 Thus the challenge of ‘stabilizing the Balkans’, in terms of ensuring long-term 
and enduring military security remains an important issue that is inextricably linked to 
building law-governed democratic states and developing market economies in the entire 
region, Albania included. “The choice for us,” notes Chris Patten, the EU’s external 
relations Commissioner, “is very clear: either we export stability to the Balkans, or the 
Balkans exports instability to us.”92
The following chapter will substantiate the findings of the last two chapters by 
bringing two real life cases, exemplifying the impact the organized crime has on 
economic and political life of the country and in particular on the new Albanian 
democracy and Albania’s security. 
 
91  COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION:European Security Strategy, Brussels, 8 December 2003. 
Located at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st15895.en03.pdf (4 March 2004)European 
Security  
92  Quoted in Lenard Cohen’s Embracing Democracy:Weak States and Institution Building in Balkan 
Europe.The Center for European Studies (CES) and Canadian Forum on Southeastern Europe 
(CFSEE), Carlton University, Europe-Russia Conference Series. Conference:Southeastern 
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IV.  THE EMERGING CRIMINAL STATE: ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN ALBANIA 
A.  THE PYRAMID SCHEMES CRISIS 
 
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of 
wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the 
epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of 
Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair.  
 
Charles Dickens- A Tale of Two Cities.  
 
The exposure and analysis of the pyramid scheme phenomenon and the 
parliamentary elections of 1996 intend to exemplify the impact organized criminal 
activities have on new democratic institutions in general, and in particular the security 
ones. During the pyramid schemes crisis security institutions such as intelligence 
services, the army and the police became mere tools of a corrupt, criminal political 
clique. This led to the almost destruction of such institutions. Though the spark that set 
off the country’s crisis was the collapse of the pyramid schemes, the underlying reason 
was Government’s disregard for the rule of law, a persistent pattern of human rights 
violations and more importantly the merging and involvement of the Government with 
criminal activities. 
 
1.  The Right “Hardware”, No “Software”93
Plato in “The Republic” notes: “Democracy is a charming form of government 
full of variety and disorder”94. This has proven to be more than true for former 
communist- block countries, Albania in particular. As new democracies grapple with the 
 
93  Referring to the tumultuous situation in 1997 Albania, Thomas Friedman explains that with the 
collapse of Communism, virtually every country now has the same ''hardware”. That is, they have all 
adopted free-market capitalism to one degree or another. But where they differ is in the ''software'' -- 
the institutions of governance, be they regulatory bodies, a watch-dog press, or uncorrupted courts, 
civil service, parliaments and police”. He states that “after the cold war Albania adopted all the right 
hardware, but it had none of the software.   In Oops! Wrong War:[Op-Ed] Thomas L. Friedman, New 
York Times. Late Edition ,East Coast, New York:  Apr. 7, 1997.  pg. A.15.  
 
94  The Merriam-Webster Dictionary of Quotations, 1992, 96. 
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pressing issues of building new institutions and establishing the market economy and rule 
of law, they are faced with security issues that are strikingly new in terms of content, 
scale and impact. The mix of these concerns has posed new challenging threats to 
national security. The interplay between them can be better understood and analyzed if it 
is placed within the framework of what have come to be termed by some as ‘gray area 
phenomena’ or problems of ‘global ungovernability’. The notion of gray areas provides a 
conceptual umbrella for the potential and realized threats posed by non-state actors, 
which range from ‘indirect erosion’ to ‘direct attacks,’ towards state institutions.95
These designations have been coined by security specialists in order to capture the 
proliferation of non-state security threats that are new, newly visible, or of intensifying 
concern and come in tandem with weak, corrupt institutions and government. They 
include, evolving terrorist organizations and agendas, international organized crime, and 
informal economic organizations that bypass or avoid the state and its economic system. 
Notable among these is the emergence of the organized crime component. This is 
because of its effectiveness, success and impact. It is also closely intertwined with 
national security threats of more direct concern to national security planners. 
The organized criminal activities increasingly linked regionally and 
internationally, are centered in part on developing relationships between narcotics 
trafficking, arms trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering and other international 
organized criminal groups in distant areas of the world where few such criminal 
relationships were previously visible and/or possible. 
In environments where state institutions are still fragile and in formation or 
rendered ineffective by sweeping political change, internal challenges, or other factors, 
criminal enterprise has been quick to fill in the vacuums or seize new opportunities. In 
addition, the new or reinvigorated centers of interethnic conflict, insurgency, and various 
forms of regional and international terrorism have acquired organized crime content. 
 
 
95  Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., The Organized Crime Dimension of Regional Conflict and Operations Other 
Than War,  in Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability, Implications for US Policy and Army Roles and 
Missions, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 125-146. 
 
See also Frankland, Erich G.,  “Turning Chaos into Cooperation” in Military Review, Dec. 94-Feb 95, 
Vol.75, Issue 1, pg.2. 
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This chapter explores the rise of the pyramid scheme crisis of 1996-97 in Albania. 
It analyzes its causes, focusing on the relations between the organized crime and politics. 
A particular focus will be to situate this form of criminal activity within the context of the 
economic and political relationships it requires for its successful conduct. The nature of 
democratic process apparently offers a breeding ground for all types of organized crime. 
The fine line between individual freedom and chaos is of prime concern in the area of 
organized crime. Therefore the chapter intends to expose the link of political influence in 
order to understand why organized crime cannot be easily controlled.  
Through the illustrations of political influence it is intended to raise awareness of 
the tenacious grip that corrupt politics has on the entire community. The state’s 
accommodation with these criminal enterprises facilitated the rise of extensive drug 
distribution networks, arms smuggling, human trafficking organized and controlled by 
domestic and foreign crime syndicates. These networks continue to inhibit market access 
to foreign capitals and undermine state institutions. The ‘financial ramifications’ of these 
networks contributed to wide-scale money laundering, tax evasion and capital flight. The 
chapter, then, considers the impact of the organized crime in the longevity of the pyramid 
schemes and addresses the question of the consequences they had on the national security 
of Albania as well as the ensuing regional security impact, notably in Kosovo and 
Macedonia but also in other Western European nations. 
The combination of political instability, a weak state, and powerful economic 
groups rooted in illicit and opaque dealings undermined reform and subsequently led to 
what is known as the weak state syndrome, i.e. the state becoming severely incapacitated 
to perform major functions. Extreme incapacitation leads to the phenomenon of the failed 
state.96 The phenomenon of the pyramid schemes in Albania is a clear example of the 
combination of such elements leading to a failed state, as we shall see during the course 




96  In the Albanian Human Development Report 2000 it has been stated: “ In the case of Albania, the 
weakness of the state is substantial and deep rooted…State weakness characterizes the entire period of 
Albanian transition. During the events of 1997, it took on alarming proportions.” 
http://www.al.undp.org. (23 September 2003). 
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2. The Intertwining of Crime and Politics 
Albania of 1996-1997 was a tragic, but illuminating, example of the new divide in 
world politics today and an expression of the contradictions generated by the pursuit of 
free market reforms and a prohibition on lucrative commodities. “The unleashing of 
market forces has unintentionally encouraged and facilitated not only legal economic 
activities, but illegal economic activities as well.”97
Albania’s initial so-called success was based to a large extent on drug smuggling, 
gun running, sanctions busting, people trafficking and the infamous pyramid schemes 
that sprouted like mushrooms. The biggest problems were weak, corrupt 
institutions/officials and criminal activities. Such phenomena spread like a cancer to all 
levels of society. Moreover, politicians, lacking strong social support and a solid political 
base “sought alliances with powerful incumbent enterprises for funding and support. This 
naturally made the state highly subject to capture.”98  Lyman and Potter in their book 
“Organized Crime” when explaining the phenomenon of political corruption state that 
“public officials, either out of greed, the need for political support and money, or the 
desire for recognition, put their policy making and enforcement powers on the market. 
Who initiates such a deal depends on circumstances, and the initiator is as likely to be the 
‘criminal’ as the ‘legitimate actor’”.99
Starting as the most closed and repressive country in Eastern Europe under 
communism, Albania quickly became the "wild East". Poorly paid policemen, a long 
coast and proximity to Western Europe made it the ideal location for illegal trade, 
including oil smuggling in violation of U.N. embargo to the war-torn "rump" 
Yugoslavia.100
 
97  Organized Crime Within the Context of Economic Relationships, Growing Threat of International 
Organized Crime: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime, Second Session, January 25, Serial 
No.83, US Government Printing Office. 
98  Transition, The First Ten Years, Analysis and Lessons for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 2002, 109 
99  Michael D. Lyman, Gary W. Potter, Organized Crime, Third Edition, (Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 
2003), p.444. 
100 In July 2000, the author was appointed Minister of Defense of Albania. In a meeting with the then 
President of the Republic, he was told by the President that during a meeting he had with Croatian 
Prime Minister the latter had expressed him his thanks on “behalf of the Croatian people” for the 
“three shiploads of arms” sent to Croatia during the conflict with Serbia. The President asked the 
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Pyramid schemes are the most flagrant example of these phenomena. The 
Western press portrayed them as classic pyramid schemes, where investments are 
repaid with the money provided by an ever-widening group of investors. In fact, the 
Albanian pyramids were a far more complex organism. First, they involved a very 
large number of people. An estimated 60% of the population invested approximately $1.5 
billion in the funds, sometimes by selling their property, livestock or family heirlooms. 
Second, unlike other pyramid schemes that were born and died throughout Eastern 
Europe since the fall of communism, Albania's schemes managed to thrive for five years. 
In a country of 3 million, it would seem surprising that enough new investors were found 
to keep the firms rolling.  “Now evidence has emerged that the pyramids stayed afloat 
because of fresh funds from a variety of illegal sources, some of them deeply involving 
the government.”101 As a matter of fact, “both the authorities and foreign observers, 
including IMF, regarded the informal lending companies as benign, and indeed making 
an important contribution to growth.”102 They engaged in some (usually highly visible) 
productive investments but in most of the cases, they used borrowed funds to finance 
criminal activities: smuggling, illegal emigration, drugs, prostitution, and arms 
trafficking. While the “record on economy and on human rights was not good, everyone 
said, ‘Well, it’s a transition. We’re in the Balkans.’”103
 
3. Organized Crime Merges with the State Machinery 
There are a series of events whose origins date to 1993 that brought about the 
pyramid schemes crisis of ’96-97. Firstly, by late 1993 early 1994, Albania was 
Minister to check on the files at the DoD, something that was done, but no documentation was found. 
Almost all records were destroyed during the ’97 crisis.  
 
101  Janus Bugajski in Southeast European Reconstruction, Winning or Loosing the Balkans? states: 
“Albania is the most dramatic example of how illicit businesses in conditions of economic crisis can 
trigger political instability. The collapsing pyramid schemes in 1997 not only left masses of Albanians 
destitute but also undermined the country’s security and political stability as public revolt spread 
through the country”, 10. 
102  Chris Jarvis The Rise and Fall of the Pyramid Schemes in Albania, IMF Staff papers, Vol. 47, No 1, 
2000 International Monetary Fund, 6. 
103  Tracy Wilkinson, The Los Angeles Times, Mar. 19,1997, p 8. 
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experiencing problems with its economy.104  Furthermore, two salient events set the 
stage for the pyramid scheme mania of late 1996: the suspension of the UN sanctions 
against the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in December 1995 and the campaign 
and outcome of the Albanian parliamentary elections in May 1996.  
It was an open secret that throughout the period of the UN sanctions, oil and many 
other goods were being smuggled through Albania to the SFRY.105  Some of the largest 
companies started up as “trading companies” and some of them were licensed to 
officially trade arms during the period of sanctions, and it is common knowledge that 
they were generally involved in illegal activities. “Persistent reports [show] that VEFA’s 
investment scheme was designed to launder money from other international activities 
including sanctions-busting and arms trading…”106  
Even while the Albanian government was condemning the rump 
Yugoslav government for its mistreatment of Albanians in Kosovo, a company named 
Shqiponja (The Eagle), run by the ruling Democratic Party (DP), was supplying 
Yugoslavia with oil through pipelines across the northern border. 107  
 
104  “With GDP stagnant and inflation running at double digit monthly, the average Albanian consumer 
witnessed his purchasing power decline by 49 percent from the previous 1991 total. By January 1994, 
the balance of trade deficit reached to 463 million Leks. During the same period, currency devaluation 
against the US dollar went from L 73.3 per dollar in 1992 to L102.1 per dollar in 1993. Forced to 
expand its energies upon its crumbling infrastructure to attract foreign investment, the Democratic 
Party-led government of Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi increased central government spending 
from L45 million to L65 million between late 1993 and late 1994.The result was a deficit which cut 
into Albania’s already dwindling foreign hard currency reserves.” Quoted. from Jane’s Intelligence 
Review article “What Brought Anarchy in Albania?” by Guz Xhudo, 1 June 1997, Edition 1997, 
Volume/issue:009/006, p.2. 
105  Sharon Johnson-Cramer, The Christian Science Monitor, Mar 20,1997, pg.7 writes that “ The schemes 
lasted for a surprising three to five years… because large sums gained from selling weapons to the 
Serbs during the war in Bosnia were invested in the schemes.” 
106 Oxford Analytica, Daily Brief, Albania Pyramid Collapses, 10 Feb. 1997, pg3. 
 
107 “The bulk of the oil, gasoline, and diesel - plus some JP1 for aircraft - is trucked from the Albanian 
port of Durres to Lake Scutari on the Albania-Montenegro border. Montenegro, allied with Belgrade, 
hence the oil can easily be passed on, has an un-policed border with Serbia: just 135 United Nations 
monitors, based at only 15 of 48 possible fordable locations, cover the 523km of river bank that 
separates Bosnia and Serbia. About 25 gas stations, with underground tanks holding over 400.000 
gallons (1.8 million liters), have sprung up on the Albanian side of the border around the small town of 
Koplik and these serve as storage points for petrol to be shipped across the lake.  An estimated 120.000 
gallons (545.000 liters) per day of gasoline and diesel has been trucked into this area in certain weekly 
periods between January and March 1995. Over one million gallons (4.5 million liters) of JP1 moved 
into Albania in February, 1995.” Quoted from International Defense Digest, in Serbs Get Plenty of Oil, 
9. International Defense Review 1 July 1995, edition: 1995 volume/issue: 028/007  
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The Independent of London supported charges from the Albanian opposition that 
the government was involved in these activities also.108 Andrew Gumbel wrote that 
drugs barons from Kosovo could operate in Albania with impunity, adding that the 
transportation of heroin and other drugs was believed to be organized by the Albanian 
secret police SHIK. He quoted intelligence sources as saying that the chain of command 
in the rackets probably went all the way to the top.  
Moreover, Gumbel wrote that Shqiponja, a company holding a monopoly on oil 
trade, was run directly by the DP and chaired by current Foreign Minister Tritan Shehu. 
He also quoted allegations in intelligence circles that Shqiponja traded in guns and drugs. 
Shqiponja officially closed up shop in January 1996, but there were allegations that its 
activities still continued. Gumbel further charged that former Interior Minister Agron 
Musaraj was pressured out of his job in May 1997 amid allegations that he was 
masterminding the entire drugs racket. According to The Independent, the Albanian 
police, during Musaraj's tenure, made only one significant drug haul, seizing about three 
kilos of heroin in February 1995. He also quoted allegations that Defense Minister Safet 
Zhulali had used his office to facilitate the transport of arms, oil and contraband 
cigarettes. Moreover, he suggested that the biggest of all the schemes, run by Albania's 
largest private company, Vefa Holdings, has funded the DP's election campaigns and was 
under investigation in Italy for ties to the Mafia. The Albanian opposition already brought 
up allegations against Musaraj and Zhulali earlier. Former Supreme Court Chief Judge, 
Zef Brozi once accused Musaraj of "directing a Mafia network and employing despotic 
methods against arrested people." In 1995, former Defense Minister Perikli  Teta, 
moreover, charged Zhulali with being involved in arms trafficking to Bosnia and 
published a list of politicians allegedly involved in illicit activities, including oil 
 
Also, shady deals were apparently reached also among senior Albanian officials and Serb criminals. 
Thus the former Albanian Minister of Interior Luan Rama said in a recent interview that the late Zeljko 
Raznjatovic, aka Arkan, visited Albania during the war in former Yugoslavia and met with the head of 
the National Intelligence Service, Bashkim Gazidede. "I state with full official and civic responsibility 
that Arkan visited Albania," Quoted from the Albanian newspaper Korrieri.Aug 2003. According to 
the same paper the visit took place in 1995 in Shkodër, the largest city in northern Albania. [Arkan, the 
leader of a paramilitary formation in the former Yugoslavia, sent his troops to Kosovo during the 1999 
conflict. He was shot dead in front of a Belgrade hotel in 15 January 2000.] 
 
108  Andrew Gumbel,,  ‘The Gangster Regime we Support’, The Independent,  February 14,1997. 
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smuggling. Already back then the government reacted with a crackdown against 
journalists reporting Teta's allegations. 
The above accusations were substantiated by other sources as well. Thus, Fred 
Abrahams of American Human Rights Watch, in his article “The Albanian House of 
Cards” states: “Donkeys tugged barrels of crude oil through the mountains while rickety 
boats floated their loads across Lake Shkoder. The southern city of Vlora, the center of 
the uprising sparked by the collapse of the pyramid schemes, was a center of smuggling 
activity to Italy and other parts of the Mediterranean. The coast from Vlora to the 
Greek border was the departure point for Albanian-produced arms that appeared in 
Rwanda and drugs distributed by Albanian families in Switzerland.”109  
Most obvious, however, was the steady flow of people who sought a better life in 
the West. A casual stroller along the beach in the South would encounter speed boats 
packed with Albanians, Kurds and Chinese who paid over $500 for the three-hour ride 
across the Adriatic Sea to Italy.110    
 
B. 1996 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
1. Democracy Undermined 
The suspension of sanctions ended the smuggling trade. One month later, because 
a key source of income had disappeared and they needed to attract more funds, the 
borrowing companies raised their interest rates to 6 per cent a month. The May ’96 
elections had a more direct impact. In reaction to uncertainty about the prospects of the 
ruling Democratic Party in the elections, and also to the entry of the new pyramid 
 
109  Fred Abrahams, The Albanian House of Cards, in Global Studies, Russia, the Eurasian Republics, 
and Central/Eastern Europe, Seventh Edition, 261-66. 
 
 Also Jane’s magazine confirms that the “self declared state [Somaliland] is reported to have received 
Kalashnikov assault rifles and ammunition from Albania.” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 
North Africa, 10 Somalia, posted 26 Jun 2002. The same magazine of 11 Mar.2003 referring to the 
situation in Rwanda in 1994, states: “Goma airport was the only remaining way for the Hutu Power 
faction to receive weapons, notably from Tirana (Albania) through Tel-Aviv (Israel).” 4. 
110   “With assistance from criminal elements, for false visas, Albanians numbered nearly 300000 in 
Greece by the end of 1994, according to Greek sources. Indeed, Italian mafia was charging between 
L350 and L1000 for false visas and Greek passports. Italian interior officials believe that the mafia 
may also be partly responsible for nearly 70000 Albanians illegally in Italy. They[Albanians] often 
serve as mules for illicit activities such as drug trafficking and arms smuggling.” Quoted from Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, May 1, 1995 Edition 1995, Volume/issue:007/005 by Gus Xhudo, 3. 
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schemes into the market, the pyramid schemes raised their interest rates again, to 8 
percent a month. The outcome of the elections was crucial. During the 26 May 1996 
elections, the DP assumed an ‘anything goes’ posture. Desperate to assure itself an 
overwhelming victory, it engaged in vote rigging and intimidation that resulted, after the 
run-off elections, with 122 seats out of 140. With over 400 international election 
observers in Albania, it was impossible to mask the dubious methods used. The US-based 
Society for Democratic Culture (SDC) confirmed that threats and intimidation did 
occur.111 The general climate of unrest, which eventually led to the large-scale riots and 
civil insurgency of February and March, can trace its roots to the period immediately 
following the May 1996 elections. The stage for future unrest was set. 
Under such circumstances, with elections widely seen as rigged, the local 
government elections scheduled for October took on a greatly increased significance. 
Chris Jarvis, a senior economist in the IMF’s Policy Development and Review 
Department, who has analyzed the pyramid scheme phenomenon in Albania, among 
other, notes that “In these circumstances, the government did not want to give the people 
any unpleasant surprises, and the tendency to ignore the growth of the pyramid schemes 
and hope that problems would never materialize was reinforced.”112  
Xhaferri and Populli between them attracted close to one million depositors 
within few months, in a country with a population of three and a half million. In the 
second half of 1996 mania took hold. In July Kamberi raised its interest rates to 10 
percent a month. In September, Populli began offering over 30 percent a month. In 
November,  Xhaferri  offered  to  treble  depositors’  money  in three months (a monthly  
 
111  In the Report prepared by the staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on 
Albania’s Parliamentary Elections of 1997 presented to the US Congress Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, among others, it has been stated that “Albania’s democratic shortcomings 
culminated in the severely flawed parliamentary elections of May 1996. The results-122 of 140 seats 
going to the Democratic Party- was a clear signal that pluralism in the country was endangered.” The 
Present Situation in Albania,  Briefing of the US Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe, Washington DC, May 23,1997. 
Also, the Economist of London of October 26, 1996, Vol.341, Iss.7989, pg.66, reports that “ Warren 
Christopher, America’s Secretary of State, admonished him [Berisha] after the parliamentary elections, 
while another American official in the region said American projects in Albania should be reviewed.” 
112  Chris Jarvis, The Rise and Fall of the Pyramid Schemes in Albania, IMF Staff papers, Vol. 47, No 1, 
2000 International Monetary Fund,9. 
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equivalent rate of 44 percent) and Sude responded with an offer to double the principal in 
two months (a 41 percent monthly rate). By November 1996, the face value of liabilities 
had reached US$ 1.2 billion.  
The government did play a key role in encouraging people to invest in the 
pyramid schemes. “The DP is accused of taking pyramid scheme money to fund its 
successful parliamentary election campaign… and of benefiting politically from the ‘feel-
good factor’, which the initial high payouts created.”113  
Government ministers promoted the "investment companies," as they were 
known, on state television; not surprisingly Albanians interpreted this as a sign of 
government support. The head of the largest company, VEFA Holding, was Albania's 
official representative to NATO's North Atlantic Assembly. The current Albanian 
President was the chairman of the North Atlantic Association, which was lavishly 
sponsored by the VEFA Company. In January, amidst public doubts of the schemes' 
legitimacy, former President Sali Berisha, stated on television that the Albanian money is 
‘the cleanest in the world.’ This statement had direct impact on the ‘flow of investments’ 
in schemes. In the Final Report of the Parliamentary Investigation Commission of the 
Albanian Parliament of July 2003, it is noted that “until the end of February 1996, the 
schemes had collected from the large public a sum worth around 250 million US dollars. 
Meanwhile, by the end of October 1996 the level of money ‘invested’ in the pyramid 
schemes reached a converted amount of 1 billion and 260 million US dollars.”114   
Other politicians from the president’s party (the DP) were less subtle. In some 
election posters in southern Albania, the names of powerful sponsors-pyramid bosses- 
appeared beside the names of Democratic Party candidates. One candidate from Vlora in 
the 1996 parliamentary campaign displayed posters of himself surrounded by the logos of 
the pyramid schemes over the slogan: ‘With the DP everybody wins’.  Senior government 
officials frequently appeared at functions and parties organized by the companies and, in 
November 1996, even as the pyramid schemes began to crumble, the Prime Minister and 
Speaker of Parliament accepted medals to celebrate the fifth anniversary of VEFA, the 
 
113 Oxford Analytica Daily brief, Albania: Pyramid Collapses, 10 February 1997,  2. 
 
114  Final Report of the Parliamentary Investigation Commission of the Albanian Parliament of July 2003,   
8. 
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largest company.115  “Trying to maximize their benefit, the DP avoided any information 
about the functioning of such structures- in the beginning they ignored, and later forced 
the governor of the Albanian National Bank to stop warning about the dangers of such 
structures.”116   
Although the National Bank of Albania did try to take some steps in blocking the 
activity by approaching the companies and telling them to get licensed “something that 
the Governor of the Bank of Albania had no intention of giving them,”117 the Chief 
Prosecutor, however, took “the view that the law did not apply to the borrowing 
companies. Nor was he disposed to investigate the companies for fraud. The Ministry of 
Justice, for its part, refused to give an interpretation.”118  
There is strong evidence that the problem was not just a legal one, but one of 
governance, and the members of the government themselves benefited from and 
supported the pyramid scheme companies. “Only in Albania did the schemes reach 
mammoth proportions and operate with the… complicity of the government.”119 Through 
all of this, the Government stayed inactive and when it was suggested that some of the 
companies might be surviving by laundering money for the Italian Mafia,120 the President 
 
115  Ibid., 8. 
116  The New York Times, Pyramid Schemes: Albania 1996-1998, 30 Sep.1998. 
117  Chris Jarvis, The Rise and Fall of the Pyramid Schemes in Albania, IMF Staff papers, Vol. 47, No 1, 
2000 International Monetary Fund, 8. 
118  Ibid. 
119  The Los Angeles Times, Feb. 3,1997, pg 1. 
120 “Allegations of Albanian government involvement in illicit trade are not new and have been repeatedly 
denied by the authorities. The latest series of accusations began following a press conference of Italian 
national anti- mafia prosecutor Piero Luigi Vigna. Last week he told journalists that Italian organized 
crime might have been involved in pyramid investment schemes… Vigna said that investigations into 
the matter had started and that he suspected that the investment companies were laundering money 
from drugs trafficking and illegal immigrants. He added that Albania had become a marijuana 
producer and that apparently coca was also being cultivated there. Also he added there was evidence 
that mobsters from the Puglia, Calabria and Campania regions of southern Italy have linked up with 
Albanian organized crime. Top police official Alessandro Pansa pointed out that the Camorra was 
operating similar schemes several years ago in the Naples area, offering 85 percent interest annually. 
The money was then apparently used to in connection with flourishing contraband cigarette trafficking. 
According to a Reuters report from 14 February, a financial consultant with close ties to four Albanian 
pyramids gave another possible source of income for the schemes. He is quoted as saying that under 
normal circumstances a pyramid could survive only 18 months at most, but that in Albania they went 
on for years because they were used also to launder money from smuggling oil to Serbia and 
Montenegro. The agency also quoted diplomatic sources saying, moreover, that arms were routed via 
Albania into Bosnia. Some economists estimate that Albania made more than $1million a day in oil 
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himself came to their defense, arguing that these were legitimate and successful Albanian 
companies. This tolerance was reflected in the neglect of both the Ministry of Justice and 
the Ministry of Finance and in the open support of the major companies by the President 
cynically insisting the scams were a ‘disease of liberty’ that happened ‘because of the 
respect we have for free initiative’.121  
Neither set of companies were licensed or subject to supervision, and in the case 
of the companies that invested on their own behalf, their reputation for involvement in 
criminal activities made information difficult and even dangerous to obtain.122   
The IMF and the World Bank did give increasingly strident warnings about the 
schemes in the course of 1996, but these warnings were not heeded. “Both institutions 
had expressed concern as far back as December 1994 about the dangers of criminal 
enterprises operating in the informal market and as a matter of fact the concern was as 
much about money laundering as about pyramid schemes.”123  
Under internal and international pressure, in February 1997, the parliament passed 
a law banning pyramid schemes (but not defining them). However, the government was 
still trying to maintain the distinction between the companies with real investments and 
the 'pure pyramid schemes,’ and it still did not move against the largest schemes.  
trade during 1993 and 1994. Much of the money probably wound up in the investment accounts. A 
Tirana banker, who declined to be named, told Reuters that the last major shipment of dirty money 
arrived at the start of 1997, with the Mafia paying $1.5 million to a fund which laundered $20 million. 
He is quoted as saying that: ‘The dirty money is plunged into the pyramids and clean money sent out 
under the guise of bogus import deals,’ adding that ‘it is easy to watch the money clear the system.’ 
Following the lifting of the U.N. embargo against federal Yugoslavia after the Dayton agreement and 
stricter controls of the Otranto straits, the pyramids apparently engaged in a ruinous interest rate war, 
which finally resulted in their collapse.” Quoted from OMRI: (Open Media Research Institute) 
Pursuing Balkan Peace,<http://www.omri.cz>  Vol. 2, No. 7, 18 February 1997 
       
 Also, in “The Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drugs, Trafficking and 
Terrorism”, Ralf Mutschke, notes that “Albanian organized crime also profited from the financial 
pyramids which they seem to have used to launder money on a large scale. Before the crash, an 
estimated 500 to 800 million USD seem to have been transferred to accounts of Italian criminal 
organizations and Albanian partners. This money was then reinvested in Western countries”.  
121  The Los Angeles Times, February 3,1997, pg.1 
122 In 1995, an IMF consultant posed briefly as a potential investor and was quickly warned that this was 
not safe.” Chris Jarvis, The Rise and Fall of the Pyramid Schemes in Albania, IMF Staff papers, Vol. 
47, No 1, 2000 International Monetary Fund, 6. 
 
123  Ibid., p.13. 
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VEFA, for example, was allowed to continue advertising on television during 
the worst of the violence. In any case, the measures taken by the government proved to be 
too little, too late. The government's authority, shaky since the May 1996 elections, had 
evaporated, and on March 8, 1997, it resigned.  The Wall Street Journal of that time, 
referring to the devastating consequences of the pyramid schemes, wrote: “This will just 
about wipe Albania out… An earthquake would have been better.”124
 
2. “Albanians Exchange Their Idealism for a Kalashnikov Rifle”125
Indeed, by this time, Albania was in chaos and anarchy bringing the country to the 
brink of civil war. The country was plunged into a crisis that undermined both the 
economy and chances for government survival, exposed a false sense of prosperity and 
led profound questioning of the nominally democratic system that Albania adopted after 
the belated fall of communism in 1991. 
 The army and police had mostly deserted. The country was “devastated by riots. 
Large areas are controlled by bands of marauders. In much of the land there is no state to 
speak of.”126  The raging anarchy in Albania was both a setback for Albania’s 
democratic developments and a threat to regional security. 
When Tirana itself fell into civil disorder the president agreed to hold new 
parliamentary elections by the end of June, and an all-party interim coalition government 
led by members of the former opposition Socialist Party was appointed.  
New legislation necessitated regulating the situation, however, proved very 
difficult to enact. Several of the largest companies were still controlled by their 
operators, and there was great reluctance, especially by members of the outgoing 
parliament, many of whom were reported to have invested in the schemes, to move firmly 
against them. There was a further delay while foreign administrators were appointed, and 
even after this the pyramid scheme owners did not give up, resisting by both legal means 
 
124  Frank Robert and King Neil Jr, Albanian Crisis Grows as Rioters in South Loot Federal Arsenals, Wall 
Street Journal, New York, March 5,1997, A.14. 
125  The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, Mass.: July 3, 1997, 5. 
126  Rebuilding Albania, New York Times, July 2, 1997, A.22. 
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(challenging the legislation in the courts) and less savory ones (threats of violence against 
the administrators). The government's lack of confidence in the courts turned out to be 
well justified.  
In November 1997, the Constitutional Court, whose members had all been 
appointed by the previous administration, declared the law under which foreign 
administrators were appointed an unconstitutional infringement of private property rights. 
Parliament responded by passing the law again as a constitutional amendment.   
It may seem remarkable that the pyramid scheme companies should 
have deposited their funds in state banks that were paying only a fraction of what 
the companies had to pay depositors, and where they were vulnerable to seizure by 
the government. The decision to do so appear to have been in part caused by the absence 
of alternatives in the short term and in part a reflection of the companies' confidence that 
the government would not interfere with them. Indeed, except in the cases of Xhaferri 
and Populli, two of the least politically connected schemes, this confidence turned out to 
be largely justified.   
In the events triggered by their collapse, over 2,000 lives were lost. Thousands 
more people were impoverished either by their unwise investments in the schemes or by 
the destruction of their property in the ensuing violence. A government, albeit one 
of dubious legitimacy, was overthrown. The arms looted during the crisis have been used 
in armed robberies in Albania and provided a ready source of weapons to Albanian 
fighters in neighboring Kosovo.  
Social, political and/or economic upheavals have always created a climate for 
crime. The situation allowed the criminal gangs to grow in strength. With no legitimate 
authority present, the criminal gangs reclaimed speedboats confiscated by the 
government and re-established the refugee and drug smuggling rings. The widespread 
lawlessness also brought about a mounting death toll from criminal killings, as well as 
accidental shootings. During 1996-1997, thirty-four policemen lost their life in fighting 
criminal gangs. Almost 2000 civilian casualties were also registered. Two hundred and 
twenty five thousand Albanians lost their life savings in the Pyramid schemes. 
By mid March 1997 armories were being looted; evacuation of foreign nationals 
and mass emigration of Albanians to Italy began. The disintegration of the police and 
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military forces resulted in widespread availability of weapons.127 “These are easily 
purchased or stolen… by criminal gangs and terrorist elements both inside and outside 
Albania. Another problem is the refugee outflow to Italy and Greece that has increased 
ethnic tension throughout the region.”128 As a matter of fact, the DP officials started the 
opening of army depots and their subsequent looting. The reasons were many but two are 
most reliable and documented, i.e., to erase all trace of the previously government-
sponsored arms trafficking and to arm the DP supporters against rioters. 129  
Italy and Greece were concerned about a repeat of 1991, when thousands of 
Albanians fled the country during the economic turmoil. Both countries stepped up 
border control. They were concerned with the danger of mass exodus and that Albania 
could become the drug capital of Europe.130  
 
3. Summary 
In Albania’s transition to democracy characterized by an environment where state 
institutions are still fragile, in formation and rendered ineffective by sweeping political 
 
127  Jane’s Intelligence Review, dated 1 Oct 1997, Volume/Issue: 004/010 states that “the Albanian Army 
has virtually ceased to exist and police deserted their posts in the face of concerted attacks by 
gangsters…” 
128  “The Present Situation in Albania”, May 23, 1997, briefing of the US Congress, Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington DC, 35. 
129  The Washington Post of May 21,1997 writes:” Mr. Berisha, who was elected in a notably unfair 
contest last year is accountable. His misrule sheltered criminal pyramid schemes whose collapse 
provoked citizen revolt. To divert angry mob, he handed out the army’s guns.”  
 Also Jane’s Intelligence Review of 1 Jun 1997, edition 1997 Volume/Issue:009/006 in its article What 
brought Anarchy in Albania?, states that “Desperate to obtain control, Berisha armed civilians without 
any checks or safeguards. These militia units claim loyalty to the president, yet in actuality are nothing 
more than armed thugs with hundreds, if not thousands, of individual agendas.” 
 Fred Abrahams of Human Rights Watch in his briefing of the US Congress Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe in May 23, 1997 notes that “The police forces and army disintegrated, and 
vigilantes armed by Berisha roamed the streets of Tirana”. http://www.house.gov/csce/. (14 September 
2003). 
130  “European law enforcement officials believed that by 1999 Albanians had become the dominant 
suppliers of heroin to Norway, Sweden, southern Germany, and Switzerland. In addition, by 1999, 
Albanian crime syndicates were challenging the hegemony of Italian syndicates in heroin trafficking 
and alien smuggling in Italy…According to Italian law enforcement, the Albanians had literally taken 
illicit trade in women and children away from traditional Italian syndicates in Italy itself by the year 
2000.”   Michael D. Lyman, and Gary W. Potter Organized Crime,-3rd ed., 376. 
 Also, The Los Angeles Times of March 5, 1997, pg.8 notes “The United States and Albania’s nearest 
neighbors are watching events with rising anxiety.” 
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change, criminal enterprise has been quick to fill in the vacuums. These non-state actors 
when merged with state and politics lead to problems of global ungovernability and 
subsequently threatened the very existence of the state both through ‘indirect erosion’ and 
‘direct attacks’. Consequently, this led to what is known as the weak state syndrome, i.e. 
severely incapacitating the state to perform its major functions. The phenomenon of the 
pyramid schemes in Albania is a clear example of the combination of such elements 
leading to a failed state. 
This chapter intended to make it clear that organized crime is such a potent threat 
to the national security of a country because of the complicity and collusion of 
government structures in organized crime activities. Organized crime itself infiltrated the 
government, assumed governmental functions, and subsequently neutralized law 
enforcement. It eventually undermined democratic institutions, security and law 
enforcement structures and the transition to a free market economy. 
Organized crime is not simply a result of lax or corrupt police practices. These 
practices definitely contribute to the growth of the organized crime, but the unseen 
manipulations in the political and legal arenas share a major responsibility. For us to 
understand why organized crime thrives in a chaotic situation and why it cannot be easily 
controlled, the link to political influence must be shown. Through the illustrations of 
political influence exemplified in the parliamentary elections of May 1996, this chapter 
intended to raise awareness of the tenacious grip that corrupt politics has on the entire 
society in general and security institutions in particular. 
This chapter strives to reveal the fact that poor governance laid at the heart of the 
pyramid scheme phenomenon. There were corrupt relationships between the companies' 
operators and the highest levels of the Albanian government, and these relationships both 
prevented government agencies from taking action against the companies and disguised 
from investors how insecure the companies were. Scars of the crisis still remain; the 
social effects of the Albanian pyramid scheme phenomenon have been considerable.131  
 
131  The Parliamentary Investigation Commission of the Albanian Parliament in its Final Report of July 
2003 concludes that the current loss of the total of 225 thousand ‘creditors’ in the pyramid schemes is 
around 830 million US dollars, p14. 
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Another element touched upon in this chapter, is the fact that the legal system is 
closely related to the political governing element. An understanding of the legal system’s 
role in organized crime control is important for citizens and law-enforcement agencies 
alike. The politicization of the Judiciary, its intentional complicity with a corrupt political 
class in handling the pyramid schemes crisis the way it did, reveals the scope of 
repercussions that ensued. 
Corruption, misrule and merging of crime with the state machinery did undermine 
the integrity of basic state institutions. It practically turned Albania into an ‘anocracy” 
where democratic and autocratic features were mixed.  
Guidance and positive pressure from international community is of vital 
importance as whistleblowers and guarantors of democratic standards applied by 
government in transition countries. Unfortunately, in the Albanian case the ‘laissez faire’ 
policy, the non-adoption of a shrewd embargo policy vis-à-vis Yugoslavia, initially 
adopted by international community with regard to the political class in Albania and an 
obvious neglect to demand for democratic standards was another element contributing to 
the situation that developed in Albania during 1996-1997 period. 
The Albanian crisis risked having a Balkan spill over. About one-third of 
Albania’s budget came from Western foreign aid. The political leverage implicit was that 
vital resources had to be used now to forestall a new Balkan crisis. However, complete 
civil war and anarchy were averted only with international intervention, which included 
the mediating efforts of the OSCE, the deployment of a multinational protection force to 
secure humanitarian aid deliveries, and close supervision of preparations for new 
elections. 
Finally and most importantly, of great significance are effects on confidence in 
Albania. It did shake the confidence of the people in the institution of vote. Before the 
crisis, Albania was a strikingly confident place: poor, beset already by serious problems 
of governance and growing economic problems, but also conscious and proud of having 
made enormous strides since the overthrow of Communism. Albania became a place 
where the denial of democratic principles and human rights thwarted any sense of 
citizenship and statehood.  For some years after the crisis Albania was a much more 
subdued place. Confidence in the institutions of government was low, crime and 
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corruption infringed on most people's lives. The resilience of the Albanian people is 
considerable, and it has been more severely tested in the past. But the pyramid scheme 
phenomenon was a sobering setback for Albania, a powerful reminder of the social costs 
of unchecked criminality.  
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V. REVIEW OF FINDINGS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. REVIEW OF FINDINGS 
Organized crime groups, as we have noted through this thesis, exploit the failure 
of state legal institutions to coordinate activities to fight them. Moreover, corruption and 
misrule have undermined the Albanian state. The institutionalized corruption has 
facilitated the rise of drug trafficking and other criminal activities. This highly profitable 
illicit activity has, in turn, exacerbated the existing corruption and undermined the 
integrity of basic state institutions. Thus the state has been unable to protect the Albanian 
citizen because it has been compromised by or collusive with organized crime groups. 
This process has been facilitated by the inadequacy of legal mechanisms. 
Albanian organized crime groups have managed to infiltrate the government, 
assumed governmental functions and neutralized law enforcement. They have managed 
to undermine democratic institutions and the transition to a normal free-market economy. 
Thus democracy is limited and the state has become impotent.  
The massive migration of the Albanians throughout the 1990s to the Western 
counties is a phenomenon that provided Albanian organized crime groups enormous 
profiting possibilities by facilitating the illegal movement of hundreds of thousands of 
Albanians in the host counties.  Yet even when these people obtain the legitimate right to 
residence and work in their new country, they often cannot escape the intimidation of the 
long arm of organized crime. An example is the  Albanian prostitutes in Western Europe 
who are compelled to stay in prostitution because enforcers from Albania threaten them 
and their families. These emigrants are still living in fear because the democracy in which 
they live is unable to protect them. 
Therefore, if a core characteristic of the state is its “monopoly over the legitimate 
use of physical force in the enforcement of order” (as emphasized in Weberian 
definitions of the state), than any erosion of that monopoly implies not only that state 
power is being challenged but also that the state’s very existence is at risk. 
Thus, Friman and Andreas note that “the proliferation of non-state violence, a 
threat to state authority in and of itself, begins to erode civil society as people question 
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the ability of state officials to offer protection, further undermining the authority of the 
state.”132 In some cases, criminal  organizations are better equipped with weaponry than 
the state agencies charged to curtail them, as was the case of the weapons looted from the 
Albanian Army depots in 1997. 
Organized crime through bribes and coercion corrupts the already weakened 
institutions. Most saliently this is revealed in the case of law enforcement agencies and 
the legal system in general. Even when the state has managed to convict and incarcerate 
members of organized crime groups, its efforts often have proven to be ineffective 
because the resources of the criminals permit them to bribe even top officials, who then 
can influence the decisions of the judiciary. 
Unpunished violence by organized crime groups is perhaps the most visible sign 
of state impotence. Individuals often rightfully believe that law enforcement is incapable 
or unwilling to protect them from the retaliation of the organized crime. Therefore, 
citizens will not report crimes committed by organized crime nor will they serve as 
witnesses. 
Organized crime groups, by corrupting the state, undermine its credibility and 
lessen its responsibility to its citizens. Moreover, the collusion of organized crime with 
international terrorism constitutes a most recent serious challenge to state authority and 
national security at the same time. Organized crime thus intimidates individuals, 
promotes violence, corrupts governmental structures, limits free markets, circumscribes 
expression, and undermines the rule of law. Weak and collusive governments are unable 
and unwilling to address the transnational organized crime problem.  
As criminal organizations begin to understand the extent of their influence and 
power, it is not too large a leap to assume that these organizations will realize that they 
may be able to do more than neutralize governments. They may be able to replace them. 
In general, however, this seems unlikely. Criminal organizations do not wish to be 
sovereignty bounded. Criminal organizations challenge aspects of state sovereignty and 
security that have traditionally been taken for granted. They prove the permeability of 
borders nominally under the control of states. “In the new security environment cross-
 
132  Richard Friman and Peters Andreas   “Introduction: International Relations and the Illicit Global 
Economy” in The illicit global economy and state power, Friman and Andreas eds.( Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 13. 
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border law evasions rather than military invasions increasingly dominate state 
concerns.”133 Therefore, governments retain sovereignty, but if they are unable to control 
the importation of guns, drugs, and people from and into their territory, sovereignty loses 
much of its significance. Sovereignty may retain its utility as a basis for diplomacy in the 
international society of states, but it no longer reflects real control over territory. 
Although the main purpose of the criminal organizations is profit, an inevitable by-
product is an implicit challenge to authority and sovereignty. The threat to state 
sovereignty and authority is insidious rather than direct: It is not a threat to the military 
strength of the state but it is a challenge to the prerogatives that are an integral part of 
statehood. 
Moreover, the increase of the Albanian organized crime groups activities both in 
Albania and abroad, has slowed and sullied the efforts of Albania to integrate in the EU 
and NATO structures and has led to Albania being almost branded as a rogue state. 
Organized crime groups operate in a complex web of interrelated and tangled 
environments. They are affected by the opportunities and constraints of the market, the 
legal system, politics, “upperworld” commerce, and the community in which they 
operate. Most attempts to analyze organized crime tend, however, to focus almost 
exclusively on the “criminal” aspect of organized crime. The “organized” aspects are, 
however, reflected more fully in relations with other social institutions. Traditionally, 
analyses of organized crime have concentrated on the deviance of organized crime rather 
than on the institutionalized and normative aspects. This emphasis obscures the 
perception of the degree to which the structure of Albania’s law and politics and weak 
institutions create and perpetuate criminal enterprises. In many areas, state political 
structures have found it easier to deal with the existing (if illegal) power brokers in the 
form of organized crime, rather than try and undermine those criminals through the law 
enforcement. In return for a blind eye turned to their activities, criminals could mobilize 
votes and money for politicians. The linkage between organized crime and political 
parties is a recurring theme. One of the main purposes of this thesis, thus, has been to 
reveal the reciprocal link between organized crime and the upperworld. 
 
133  Ibid., 2. 
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Evidence provided in this thesis shows that in order to understand organized 
crime we must first understand its social context. That social context is defined by two 
recurring themes running through the organization of crime: official corruption and the 
exigencies of the political economy. The evidence is compelling that organized crime 
should not be conceptualized simply as a dysfunction in the society but as part and parcel 
of the existing political, economic system. This point of view has compelling 
implications. The argument advanced here cautions policymakers to attack the right 
targets in their battle against organized crime.  
The existence of illicit drug dealers, arms and human traffickers, loan sharks, and 
other illegal entrepreneurs is due to the fact that the legitimate marketplace leaves a 
number of potential “customers” un-served. The quest of Albanians for a better life and 
their subsequent efforts to illegally migrate to the West (because of impossibility of 
acquiring entry visas) is a case in point. The Albanian Government has failed to persuade 
European countries to follow a more tolerant visa policy towards the Albanians, hence a  
much demanded commodity is unavailable through lawful channels. 
Control of organized crime is achieved only by understanding and learning how to 
reduce the domain of the illicit entrepreneur and a deeper analysis of the dynamics that 
nurture its illicit activities. Any control strategy that fails to recognize the importance of 
organized crime’s political and economic links is dommed to failure. So rather than 
directing enforcement efforts at specific individuals or groups, a realistic view of 
organized crime points to the importance of regulation and oversight in both the 
economic and political communities. 
There is little reason to believe that powerful political and economic interests that 
profit handsomely from organized crime are suddenly likely to adopt effective measures 
to curtail what is a major source of wealth in Albania. But once those political and 
business entities can be kept in check through a system of regulation and scrutinization, 
control of organized crime will become more of a reality than an illusion. 
Furthermore, not all states oppose the activities of organized crime. Alliances of 
convenience between states and criminal organizations could pose serious security 
threats, especially from those trafficking in weapons, in particular nuclear and chemical 
materials. As soon as a trafficking network is functioning effectively, product 
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diversification is easy. Organizations that deal in drugs can also traffic in technology and 
components for weapons of mass destruction. Whether the recipients of such transfers are 
terrorist groups or states, the link between criminal activities and security is obvious. 
The international link leads us to the notion of transnational organized crime that 
recently has become increasingly associated with security considerations. This trend 
peaked with the US President Bill Clinton defining the fight against organized crime as a 
national security priority. Previously the United States had identified drug trafficking as a 
national security threat.  “In the national security lexicon, a threat is by definition 
external; its alien provenance is indeed how one begins to know it is a threat.” 134  We 
therefore must not underestimate the scope and magnitude of this threat. The evidence 
that criminal activity today is borderless, lucrative, powerful, and threatening is indeed 
alarming. Thus, for instance, Wendy Chamberlin, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, 
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs notes that “Colombian 
cocaine traffickers negotiate poly-drug transactions with Nigerian and Russian partners 
from five-star hotels in Albania. They do business across many borders, often times with 
impunity.” 135
Former US Attorney General, Janet Reno noted at the 1999 G-8 Ministerial in 
Moscow that "transnational organized crime has changed the way we think about 
sovereign boundaries."136 Quite simply she was saying, to be effective, the response 





134  Monica Serrano “Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: Business as Usual?” in 
Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: Business as Usual? Mats Berdal and 
Monica Serrano eds. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 28 
135 Wendy Chamberlain, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau for International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs in “Intensifying the Fight Against Transnational Organized Crime”, 
Remarks at the European Union-United States Conference on Strategies to Combat Transnational 
Organized Crime Ghent, Belgium January 23, 2001. 
 
136  Remarks by Janet Reno, US Attorney General at the 1999 G-8 Ministerial in Moscow, quoted in 
Intensifying the Fight Against Transnational Organized Crime by Wendy Chamberlain, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
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The Albanian government’s responses to date are characterized more by rhetoric 
than substance, while those initiatives that have been taken reflect a basic 
misunderstanding of the causes, dynamics, and consequences of the criminal sector in the 
country. There is a simple explanation to this: no indepth analysis has been carried out so 
far. Consequently policies have tended to be reactive rather than pro active. 
There have been some indications that the Albanian government has woken up to 
the growing threat. Thus far, however, the government has done too little, too late with 
the result that it has been no match for the mafia. There are several reasons for this: 
 First, organized crime, thanks to the corruption of the bureaucratic apparatus and 
to the constant powerful financial infusions it received from its activities is 
capable of “buying” any police authority, procurator or judge. 
 Second, law enforcement organs, for various reasons, were deprived of many of 
their most experienced professionals. One of these reasons was the allure of the 
commercial sector, which often provided these professionals with income several 
times their meager salaries. 
 Third, although the government is continually restructuring and reorganizing law 
enforcement agencies, a truly serious reform that would improve their work has 
simply not occurred. The resulting tensions, distractions, and demotions 
demoralize the ranks. Moreover, Albania does not have an independent judiciary 
and no way of tackling more sophisticated varieties of white-collar crime. 
 Fourth, because it is able to operate with such a high degree of impunity, 
organized crime has become a major impediment to the development of the civil 
society. 
 Fifth, it is also clear that organized crime has supplanted many of the functions of 
the state. For instance, organized crime provides many of the services that citizens 
expect from the state, the most salient and dramatic example is the ability to 
provide for the commodity of “freedom of movement” abroad, a commodity 





                                                
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The way we conceptualize and understand organized crime prescribes the means 
selected to control it. Detailed policy alternatives are beyond the scope of this thesis , but 
several thematic departures from the present situation can be suggested. Specific policies 
directed at corruption, money laundring, drug and human trafficking, arm possession, and 
the strategic selection of law enforcement targets and policies directed at market demand 
can be suggested. 
Thus, organized crime fighting in Albania is more than a matter of just law 
enforcement: it should include at least four categories of initiatives- political, law 
enforcement, social/grassroots and international. 
The anti mafia struggle is a global one in which Albania badly needs the help and 
the encouragement of EU and other international partners. At the same time it is a 
struggle that requires the individual citizen to play his or her part. As the Italian icon 
judge Giovanni Falcone, assassinated by the Mafia in 1992 once wrote, “Fortified by our 
experiences, both positive and negative, we must move forward, but not with empty 
rhetoric, and no longer relying on the extraordinary commitment of a few but on the 
ordinary commitment of everyone of us, in a struggle which is, above all, one for a 
civilized society, and which can and must be won.”137 In fact, the ultimate solution to 
organized crime will not be achieved through enforcement alone. Efforts must be directed 
toward reducing society’s desire to indulge in and sanction these types of criminal 
activity. Thus, one premise for the suppression of organized criminal activities is to 
recognize that lack of awareness and concern by the public is organized crime’s greatest 
ally. The efforts of the society directed toward controlling organized crime activities will 
be doomed to failure unless the public is made aware of the magnitude of threat of 
organized crime. Publicity and exposure of illegal activities is one of the surest ways to 
dry up sources of revenue for an organization engaged in criminal activities. 
There is a great discrepancy in what society purports to believe and what it does. 
Consequently, there are many who, although espousing morality, are inclined to engage 
in illegal activities. Therefore, a new national image of what the Albanian society is 
 
137  Giovanni Falcone, Interventi e Proposte (1982-1992) (Milan: Sansoni Editore,1994) pp.343-344. 
Quoted in Anti Mafia Efforts in Italy 1992-1997 by Alison Jamieson. Source: Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, Jul-Sep 98,  Vol.21 Issue 3. 
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going to be will have to emerge. Should our society hold to the image that social, political 
and economic power might be derived from “any source”, the cherished norms and ethic 
of morality as presently perceived will wither and vanish. 
Sound institution building is a key ingredient in coping with the organized crime 
phenomenon. We should thus target building a cadre of corruption-resistant officials, 
legislators, judges, prosecutors, investigators, and regulators who can develop and 
enforce the type of complex laws necessary to prosecute large and sophisticated crime 
networks. These institution-building efforts should focus on developing all elements of an 
effective criminal justice system, including police, prosecutors, and judges. Through 
training and technical assistance we should highlight methods to combat criminal 
enterprises, including alien smuggling, drug trafficking, money laundering, and financial 
crimes. We should conduct training, provide equipment, draft coherent criminal codes, 
create enforceable codes of ethics, and develop professional legal and law enforcement 
institutions.  
Thus at the law enforcement level, a whole cadre of young officers should be 
created. They should be, at a minimum, high school graduates who have completed their 
military obligation. These young police officers should be trained in an American type 
police academy and upon graduation assigned as patrol level officers. Experience and 
additional training should allow them to move forward in their careers based on their 
accomplishments and testing. The present system of having a special school of higher 
education for officers precludes outstanding and ambitious young police officers from 
moving into positions of leadership.  
Policing should be an apolitical issue, and police chiefs should be able to resist 
any political involvement in their operation without fear of demotion. 
 Also, a better coordination among law enforcing agencies is a must. To this end, 
the current Anti Organized Crime unit at the Ministry of Public Order (MoPO) of Albania 
should be formally constituted by parliamentary law as an urgent response to the need for 
a better coordination and greater professionalism in anti organized crime investigations. 
Although it is part of the MoPO, it should be conceived as an interagency body envisaged 
as the principal repository of expertise in the area of organized crime. It should have at 
least three sections, namely preventive investigations, judicial investigations, and 
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international relations. It should be the principal office with responsibilities for 
preventing infiltration into public institutions, for carrying out asset tracing investigations 
and for implementing operations that might arise from these. The head of the unit should 
receive reports from the intelligence services as well as expert forensic and ballistic 
reports and should be responsible for the coordination of all preventive investigations for 
all the police forces in the area of organized crime. The agent functioning under this unit 
should be part of the judicial police unlike intelligence agents, and should be obliged to 
inform judicial authorities immediately when a crime has been committed. It is important 
that the unit, by law, should be financially independent. 
Another missing institution that should be created is the General Council of anti 
Organized Crime Fighting. The Minister of Public Order should head this body. Its 
members should include the chief of police, the heads of the financial and customs police 
and the directors of the domestic and military intelligence services. The head of this anti- 
organized crime unit should also be a designated participant. This body should be 
responsible for the overall anti-crime strategies, setting the objectives to be reached for 
each force, the rationalization of resources and instruments available to fight organized 
crime, and evaluate the results, with proposals for improvement. 
A credible witness protection scheme must be established. Given the fact that in 
Albania there is a small population and it has close kin-networks, government authorities 
should view the possibility of third country repatriation.  
Following the experience of Western democracies that have had to cope with the 
organized crime phenomenon, the Albanian parliament should create an Anti Organized 
Crime Commission. The composition of the commission should be all encompassing, i.e. 
including members from all political parties. Its task should be to study the phenomenon 
of organized crime and to evaluate the appropriateness of the existing measures, 
legislatively and administratively, against results. The Commission should have judicial 
powers in that it could instruct the judicial police to carry out investigations, it could ask 
for copies of court proceedings, and it should be entitled to ask for any form of 
collaboration its members would deem necessary. Those who provide testimony to the 
Commission should be obliged to tell the truth. The Commission should report to the 
Parliament as often as desired, but at least on an annual basis. 
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Parliamentary immunity oils the criminal-political nexus. Thus immunity should 
be awarded only to the extent that it is essential for parliamentarians and ministers to 
carry out their duties. 
Political party funding also needs to be addressed. Much political party funding is 
opaque and representatives of different political parties are assumed to take money from 
shady sources. 
In exploring solutions, we talk about the importance of information sharing. But 
this doesn't just happen automatically, and it doesn't encompass all the opportunities for 
cooperation. The solution, in part, is to negotiate a wide framework of agreements such 
as Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Treaties to facilitate exchanges. The 
countries of the Southeastern Europe need therefore, to take a balanced approach 
gathering and collating criminal intelligence. Operations should be based on accurate 
threat assessment, not on political or media priorities. The Vlora International Anti 
Trafficking Center138 is a useful institution that could serve as the mechanism to 
implement the above idea. 
It is with this backdrop that crime becomes a diplomatic concern. Diplomacy can 
create that environment of international norms and procedures. Diplomacy can be used to 
promote political will and develop cooperation. Diplomacy can establish guidelines and 
broader frameworks for cooperation. In this framework, a better coordination is required  
between the Albanianan law enforcing agencies and foreign partners such as EU 
assistance missions, but also those missions operating under bilateral agreements such as 
the Italian, Greek, German and American ones. The first necessary step to achive an 
efficient cooperation is by establishing a culture of trust among these agencies,which for 
the moment is missing. To that goal the Albanian authorities must prove that they are 
serious and dedicated in the fight against organized crime. They should, through deeds, 
prove that they are impartial and not advancing political agendas of the ruling party. On 
the other side, foreign missions assisting Albanian law enforcing agencies should  work 
better in terms of information sharing and particularly providing technical assistance. 
 
138  In March 2001 the Ministers of Interior of Albania, Germany, Italy and Greece, at the initiative of the 
Albanian Minister of Public Order, gathered in Tirana and decided the establishment of the Vlora 
International Anti-Trafficking Center, conceived as an intelligence analysis and policy-making center 
in the fight against illegal trafficking of all kinds. 
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We won't find a single easy solution or silver bullet. But I am confident that by 
taking decisive measures and, most importantly, showing a strong political will to fight 
organized crime, we will be able to fight efficiently against it and put those syndicates, 
once and for all, on the defensive. The social, economic, and political stakes are simply 
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